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THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT INSURANCE
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Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Abstract
Positioned in a lively current debate concerning how to design auditor incentives
to optimize financial statement auditing, this Article presents the more ambitious
financial statement insurance alternative. This breaks from the existing securities
regulation framework to draw directly on insurance markets and law. Based on upon an
evaluation of major structural and policy-related features of the concept, the assessment
prescribes a framework to permit companies, on an experimental-basis and with investor
approval, to use financial statement insurance as an optional alternative to the existing
model of financial statement auditing backed by auditor liability.
The financial statement insurance concept, pioneered by New York University
Accounting Professor Joshua Ronen, promises considerable advantages over traditional
financial statement auditing though, as with any proposal, presents its own set of
challenges. This Article expands the model first sketched by Dr. Ronen, extending and
interpreting it to examine its efficacy, attempting to show how certain limitations can be
overcome.
A chief challenge is relating state insurance law, the default applicable to
insurance policies including FSI, to federal securities regulation. A general method is to
develop for financial statement insurance the functional equivalent of the U.S. Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 applicable to contracts governing public debt securities. This
would allow substantial freedom of contract in policy terms, governed by state law, while
mandating certain specific terms and establishing minimum federal parameters for
others. Most other hurdles arising from the interplay between state insurance law and
federal securities regulation can be overcome using disclosure, while more uncertain are
issues associated with preserving insurer solvency if financial statement insurance is
placed at the center of the public-company financial reporting system.
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INTRODUCTION
A partial solution to corporate structure’s separation of ownership from control
requires managers to report an accounting of the corporation’s condition and performance
to investors, using a generally recognized accounting system and a third-party auditor
vouching for the report’s veracity.1 Auditors face inherent conflicts and capture risks that
impair this mechanisms’ efficacy. Resulting limits were evident in the wave of audit
failures of the late 1990s and early 2000s, spawning numerous suggested prescriptions to
strengthen this monitoring mechanism.
Adopted repairs include new auditor independence and oversight rules, as well as
a new audit of internal control over financial reporting.2 Other pending proposals
contemplate imposing various forms of modified strict liability on auditors, using debated
mechanisms for establishing an ex ante damages formula intended to raise the stakes
auditors face from audit failure.3 These repairs and proposals mitigate conflict and
capture risks, but only indirectly, stiffening structural and monetary incentives. To nip
1

The central challenge of corporate governance is the agency problem, the separation of
ownership from control that dates to the chartering of the Dutch and British East India
companies four centuries ago. No ultimately satisfactory solution to the problem has been
found. Various partial solutions provide rickety bridges across the chasm. Aside from
this Article’s subject of audited financial reporting, a related partial solution provides that
directors owe the corporation and its owners fiduciary obligations to act selflessly, rooted
in common law. The traditional strength of this sealant decayed during the 20th century.
See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966). Modern efforts
to seal cracks left by this erosion included requiring some or all of these persons to be
otherwise independent of the corporation. These rules originated in stock exchange listing
standards, and were fortified by federal law in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 13,346, 1977 SEC LEXIS 2252
(Mar. 9, 1977); see also Noyes E. Leech & Robert H. Mundheim, The Outside Director
of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 BUS. LAW. 1799 (1976); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, § ___, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. ____. Contemporary
efforts sought to bridge the separation by making owners out of managers, a theoretically
coherent proposition twisted into irrationality by making managers into option-holders,
not owners. See LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (forthcoming
Harvard University Press 2004). Even so, directors and officers are subject to liability for
various breaches, and this exposure is routinely backstopped by insurance (and is also
limited by exculpatory devices and covered by indemnification mechanisms). See
Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability (SSRN,
Nov. 2003). Part II discusses such insurance, and its relation to the insurance concept
developed in this Article.
2

See infra Part I.A.

3

See infra Part I.B.

3

these problems closer to the bud, this Article considers financial statement insurance
(FSI) as an optional alternative to traditional financial statement auditing (FSA) and
auditor liability.
FSI removes auditors from capture and conflict risks inherent in their relationship
with management byput ting them in the employ of independent insurers with vested
interests in quality financial reporting more nearly aligned with investor interests. FSI
would be an alternative to the traditional FSA model, recommended by management and
subject to investor approval. Companies thus would choose either to use traditional FSA
or instead opt for FSI.
FSI policies would cover damages arising from audit failure—that is, damages
due to financial misstatements auditors did not discover—and replace both auditor and
issuer liability; it would not replace liability exposure of any other party, including
directors and officers, attorneys or underwriters. Existing federal securities laws
governing FSA would remain in place and would be amended to permit FSI using federal
minimum standards; relevant state insurance laws would be molded using these minimum
standards to assure that FSI facilitates achieving the same ultimate objectives FSA seeks
to achieve.
Evaluating FSI requires a comparison to FSA as traditionally practiced, as
recently modified and as it would exist if modified according to pending reform
proposals. Traditional FSA is appealing for its general historical reliability, its familiarity
and political acceptability; with strengthened auditor independence and oversight, FSA’s
traditional appeal is enhanced. Supplemented by new control audits, it is now also
designed to provide signals to investors concerning the reliability of a company’s
financial statements. Pending proposals prescribe modifying auditor liability standards
and damages in order to induce them to act more like insurers.
FSI compares favorably on each of these points: it is insurance, making auditors
agents of insurers; transcends the auditor-independence challenges recent reforms
struggle with; sets damage payouts based upon capital market and insurance market
information; and provides a financial statement reliability index through the resulting
premium-coverage mix companies are offered for FSI policies. On the other hand,
problems of novelty, administrative details, and complexities associated with state
insurance law integrating with federal securities regulation objectives pose significant
challenges to FSI’s efficacy. On balance, this Article’s assessment indicates that FSI
provides promise of superiority to FSA, though not perfection, and that one way to
exploit its potential is to offer it on an experimental basis to investors as an alternative to
FSA, with FSA as the default model, and establishing minimum federal requirements for
FSI policies to qualify as a lawful alternative to FSI.

4

Part I presents the basics of traditional FSA and the main features of FSI.4 It
identifies the core challenges of the traditional auditing model, shows how recent reforms
and pending proposals mitigate these, and points out how the proposals impliedly suggest
a formal insurance-auditing model as at least an attractive public- policy option. It
introduces the following key features of an FSI model: an optional alternative to FSA that
management proposes subject to an approving investor vote based upon full disclosure of
proposed policy terms, including premium and coverage; auditors engaged by insurers
perform a full financial statement audit and only companies earning unqualified opinions
receive policies (for others, no changes from existing FSA practice occur); and FSI would
not alter the exposure to liability of any parties other than auditors and companies
themselves (the liability of directors, officers, attorneys, underwriters and others would
be unaffected). This discussion includes assessment of the comparative incentive effects
and trade-offs between FSA and FSI.
Part II involves more elaborate examination of FSI, chiefly from insurance law
and practice perspectives. This advanced inquiry is necessary as these matters bear
significantly on FSI’s efficacy and appeal. FSI would be governed by state insurance
law, yet obliged to serve goals of federal securities regulation. This Part shows how
aspects of insurance law and practice would need to be approached to achieve this
marrying. Despite significant challenges, the Part indicates that achievement is facilitated
by FSI’s sui genersis character, meaning that while it bears superficial resemblance to
other insurance (such as directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance), it can and must be
fundamentally different. Differences can be maintained using existing insurance law
concepts and market practices, to be codified in federal securities law as minimum
standards analogous to the federal securities law approach to public debt instruments
under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.
Part III broadens this examination of insurance intricacies by generalizing
discussion of the necessary coordination between federal securities regulation and state
insurance law to make FSI workable. Essential to FSI’s efficacy is comfort that state
insurance law provide a basis for promoting federal securities regulation’s policy
objectives at least as well as the existing FSA approach. A key issue is preserving insurer
solvency for the sake of systemic stability. In short, the Article concludes, recent reforms
and various pending proposals seek to improve auditor effectiveness through
independence enhancement, liability exposure or damages-specification. FSI, in contrast,

4

The FSI model developed and evaluated here is a substantially modified, reinterpreted
and extended version of that sketched in Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial
Statement Insurance and GAAP Revisited, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. 39, 48-60 (2002)
[hereinafter, Ronen, Post-Enron Reform]; see also Alex Dontoh, Joshua Ronen & Bharat
Sarath, Financial Statements Insurance (SSRN 2003) (providing a formal economic
model of certain aspects of FSI); Joshua Ronen & Julius Cherny, Is Insurance a Solution
to the Auditing Dilemma?, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, LIFE & HEALTH/FINANCIAL
SERVICES EDITION (Aug. 12, 2002); Joshua Ronen, A Market Solution to the Accounting
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (March 8, 2002), at A21 (short opinion piece for popular audience).
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would enable companies and their investors to choose a potentially more effective
auditing function structure.5
5

This Article’s title uses the word “gatekeepers” metaphorically, and the Article never
uses the word again because it has no analytical utility or legal significance. The label
originated to designate investment banking firms as among professionals participating in
capital formation and securities pricing processes. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 613-21 (1984).
The label has been applied to include auditors, lawyers, and even boards of directors, see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern
Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195, 1210-13, 1232-33 (1999), as well as rating
agencies and securities analysts, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:
The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 354 (2004)
[hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform]. In text having no legal
significance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act says the concept designates “securities
professionals,” defined illustratively then tautologically as “accountants, public
accounting firms, investment bankers, investment advisors, brokers, dealers, attorneys,
and other securities professionals.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 703, Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. § 7201.
Scholars provide alternative definitions. One defines “gatekeepers” as “private
parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their cooperation from
wrongdoers.” Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 63 (1986). Another dubs them “parties
who sell a product or service that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular
market or engage in particular services.” Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 53, 58 (2003). Others narrow these capacious definitions, limiting it to
those positioned to monitor effectively to prevent misuse of a product or service they
contribute. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra, at n. 14. Pursuing this
definition, gatekeepers possess “significant reputational capital” and in any transaction
enjoy a benefit small relative to the benefit of the company for which they work. Id., at
308. Under these approaches, it becomes contestable whether certain professionals, such
as lawyers, can be “gatekeepers.” See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra, at
361. The label has even been used both to denominate outsiders who serve a board of
directors and alternatively the board of directors itself. Compare Coffee, Gatekeeper
Failure and Reform, supra, at 308 (term “widely used to refer to the outside professionals
who serve the board or investors”) with id. n. 1 (citing Coffee, Brave New World, supra,
as discussing “the role of . . . directors as ‘gatekeepers’”).
Despite futile efforts at creating a meaningful general category, it is obvious that
professionals within any such category differ significantly. See Coffee, Gatekeeper
Failure and Reform, supra, at 306 & 346-64 (“all gatekeepers are not alike,” and
developing proposals with entirely different content for auditors and for securities
lawyers). Roles vary with product or service type and the information its buyers and
users receive. Also varying are what professionals attest to or certify, such as financial
statement assertions, legality of a securities issuance, quality of a debt instrument and so
on. Differing professional contributions pose different results for overall wealth and
welfare. Accordingly, also varying are all other public policy aspects of their respective
6

I. CHALLENGES
Since the 1930s, federal securities laws have required public companies to
provide independently audited financial statements to the public.6 This traditional
financial statement auditing (FSA) is an assurance mechanism. It relies on a tripartite
principal-agent-beneficiary model. The process involves a company engaging and
paying an auditor. The auditor provides assurance for use by third parties. The thirdparty assurance takes the form of the auditor’s written opinion concerning managerial
assertions. When third parties incur damages arising out of the assured information, they
have legal recourse to, among others, the auditor under various theories of common law
and federal securities law. In turn, auditors buy general malpractice liability insurance
covering claims made for losses arising from their various engagements. This insurance
is aggregate, not tailored to risks of particular engagements.
Auditor assurance is limited. Apart from considerable epistemological challenges
auditors face in attesting to managerial assertions,7 structural limits exist. These include
conflicting incentives because the auditor reviews the assertions of those responsible for
hiring, firing and paying it; capture, due to the protracted relationship that arises between
those parties and the auditor; and independence, necessary to provide objective assurance
but subject to compromise from the effects of conflicts and capture. Limitations also
arise from legal aspects of the relationship, including the absence of auditor liability for
aiding and abetting those making fraudulent financial statement assertions8 and the use of
proportional rather than joint-and-several liability regimes.9
performance, including requirements, expectations, capacities, incentives and legal
liability for failure. As with other metaphors, the term’s promiscuous usages are likely to
become more misleading than useful. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Railway Co., 244 N.Y.
84, 94 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) (“Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting
as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.”).
6

See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77aa; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
78m(a)(2). Before these statutes imposed mandatory independent financial statement
audits, the practice had been optional and generally used by select companies. See Sean
M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Accountants and Congress Created
the Problem of Auditor Independence 45 B.C. L. REV. ___, ___ (forthcoming 2004);
GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING (1998), at 457 ff.
7

Challenges emanate from the limitations of testing managerial assertions as well as the
qualitative character of certain accounting principles. See MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT
SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997), at 133.
8

See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).

9

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,
758 codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4.
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These limitations, alone and in combination, were identified as systemic
contributors to the numerous and sizable audit failures of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Reform proposals proliferated. Those adopted centered on structural aspects, including
replacing managerial auditor supervision with independent audit committee
supervision;10 establishing as federal law mandatory audit-partner rotation on particular
audit engagements;11 restricting the scope of non-audit services auditors may perform for
audit clients;12 and creating a quasi-governmental body to set auditing standards and
review and discipline performance of auditing firms.13 In addition, a new audit exercise
concerning internal control over financial reporting was mandated to deepen transparency
in the financial reporting process.14
Despite reform innovations, commentators identify continuing limitations in the
structure of auditing. Commentators focus on legal liability aspects that could be
adjusted to address remaining limitations on the traditional auditing arrangement.
Concerns and reforms of these commentators, while generally addressing only the
financial statement aspects of auditing, could also apply generally to the new audit of
internal control, though this new exercise diminishes some of the concerns raised. Even
so, these alternative reform models provide a variety of potential benefits, as well as
costs, worth considering as the other reforms take hold and reveal relative effectiveness
in achieving their objectives.15
10

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C.
____.
11

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 203, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C.
____.
12

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C.
____.
13

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 101, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C.
____. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board and Its Public/Private Status (manuscript,
Summer 2004) (the second word of the manuscript’s title expresses one commonly
uttered acronym for PCAOB; the more formal pronunciation is pea-cob).
14

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§102 & 404, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15
U.S.C. ____.
15

Prudence may suggest allowing the enacted reforms time to test effectiveness before
pursuing alternatives. Cf. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT ON
MANDATORY ROTATION OF AUDIT FIRMS (2004) (study required by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act concluding that panoply of reforms need to be given time to determine whether
additional federal steps, such as mandatory rotation of audit firms at companies, are
indicated). Enacted reforms should not prevent developing alternative proposals,
however, for they may yet be needed when weaknesses appear. A swirling range of
8

A. Recent Reforms
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and its newly-created Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) responded to diminished public confidence in the
integrity of financial reporting caused by debacles of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
SOX enhanced auditor independence rules and created and anointed PCAOB, the first
attempt consciously to insulate audit standard-setting from auditor lobbying.16
1. Independence — Auditor independence is a cornerstone to promote reliability
of financial statement audits. During the 1980s, auditors increasingly diversified their
service offerings into various professional activities apart from auditing. When rendered
for audit clients, these activities threatened auditor independence, in fact or appearance.
In response, in the late 1990s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) restricted
auditors from performing designated services for audit clients.17 SOX elevated the
regulatory restrictions to federal law.18 Additional efforts to enhance auditor
independence include empowering audit committees rather than managers to hire,
supervise and terminate auditors,19 and requiring audit firms to rotate lead audit partners
on audit engagements every five years.20
extant reform concepts, after all, formed the basis for nearly every provision of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003)
(documenting provenance of Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions in existing law, practice, or
proposal).
16

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 101, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C.
____.
17

AMENDMENT OF RULE 2-01
Accountants).

OF

REGULATION S-X (Reg. § 210.2-01, Qualifications of

18

Under SOX, as under the pre-existing SEC rules, auditors in no event may perform any
of the following services for audit clients: bookkeeping; financial information systems;
appraisal, valuation or fairness opinions; actuarial; internal audit; human resources;
broker/dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; or legal and expert
services. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15
U.S.C. ____ (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l); see also S.E.C. Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.201(c) (4)(i)-(ix).
19

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C.
____.
20

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 203, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C.
____. Previous auditing standards set this term limit at seven years. AICPA DIVISION
FOR CPA FIRMS, SEC PRACTICE SECTION, SECPS MANUAL 1-6, 2-24.
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2. Oversight — PCAOB is charged with reviewing auditor performance,
replacing the previous peer-review system where auditing firms evaluated the
performance of each other.21 It is also charged with articulating standards autonomously
using a public process, jettisoning the erstwhile process of standard-generation in which
the large auditing firms directly participated with a coterie of standard-setters drawn
largely from those firms.22 Standards PCAOB has promulgated indicate a level of auditprofession oversight unprecedented in modern U.S. financial reporting history. This
enhanced oversight is intended to strengthen the quality and reliability of traditional
financial statement auditing as a mechanism bridging corporate structure’s separation of
ownership from control.23
3. Control-Auditing — The new independence and oversight features of auditing
are accompanied by an elaborate new exercise involving audits of internal control over
financial reporting—the processes a company uses to promote reliability of its financial
reporting. Traditionally, auditors provided opinions on financial statements (though they
could also cover other agreed-upon procedures). The new system expands both the scope
and quality of traditional assurance to cover a company’s internal control over financial
reporting. This includes requiring narrative auditor disclosure concerning results of the
control audit as a way to provide more complete information to investors about the
reliability of a company’s financial statements.24
A key attraction of this new exercise is to deepen transparency in the financial
reporting process by explaining a company’s likely ability to generate reliable financial

21

PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), INSPECTION OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTING FIRMS, PCAOB RELEASE NO. 2003-019, PCAOB RULEMAKING DOCKET
NO. 006 (October 7, 2003) (adopted pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 104(a) to
provide a continuing program of registered audit firm inspections by PCAOB).
22

PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), STATEMENT
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AUDITING AND OTHER PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,
PCAOB RELEASE NO. 2003-005, PCAOB RULEMAKING DOCKET NO. 004 (April 18,
2003).
23

See Jonathan R. Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of
Commodification, Independence and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 1167 (2003) (identifying fatal flaws in existing audit firm structures, noting partial
solutions provided in Sarbanes-Oxley and prescribing steps PCAOB must take to alter
these structures in order to achieve quality independent financial statement audits).
24

For a comprehensive analysis, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s
New Early Warning System: Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55
HASTINGS L. J. ___ (forthcoming June 2004) [hereinafter Cunningham, Facilitating
Auditing’s New Early Warning System].

10

statements in future accounting periods.25 Weaknesses in internal control require auditors
to provide early warnings to investors of impaired financial statement reliability.
Associated public rebuke is in turn intended to promote managerial diligence to
strengthen financial statement reporting quality and thus to bolster investor protection.
4. Auditor Liability — Auditors are subject to civil and criminal liability when
their work fails to satisfy applicable legal requirements. Applicable legal requirements
generally derive from relevant auditing standards, established as legal requirements in
numerous state professional-obligation laws and federal securities law sections. Principal
federal laws are Section 11 under the Securities Act of 193326 and Section 10(b) under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.27 The former applies to registered public offerings
of securities and exposes auditors to liability under negligence theories of liability,
subject to an affirmative defense of reasonable investigation and belief; the latter applies
to secondary trading in securities and exposes auditors to liability under fraud theories.
Both standards have been the object of substantial modulation in recent years, the former
through the control-auditing innovation just mentioned,28 the latter through the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,29 and both, to some extent, under SOX.30
25

PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), RELEASE
ACCOMPANYING AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER
FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS (March 9, 2004) [hereinafter AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2], at 3 (exercise is
intended to provide investors and the public “an independent reason to rely on
management’s description of the company’s internal control over financial reporting”).
26

15 U.S.C. § 77k.

27

15 U.S.C. § 78j. Others include (1) Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act,
which creates private rights of action against persons, including accountants, who “make
or cause to be made” materially misleading statements in reports or other documents filed
with the SEC, 15 U.S.C. § 78r and (2) Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
which imposes on auditors the duties of inquiry and disclosure. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a).

28

See Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System, supra note 24, at
___ (explaining the effect of control audits on Section 11 duties and liabilities of
auditors).
29

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,
758 codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (adopting heightened pleading standards,
staying discovery pending motions to dismiss and shifting to proportional from joint-andseveral liability); see also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p, 78bb(f) (effectively banning
related legal actions from state-court adjudication).
30

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 804, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. §
____ (extending the period of limitations on actions for private fraud claims under
Section 10(b)).
11

Auditors buy malpractice liability insurance to backstop their exposure to such
legal claims, using policies of general applicability to particular periods of time not
tailored to particular engagements and associated risks of audit failure. This policy
generality may pose adverse incentive effects to calibrate auditing tasks to risks of
particular engagements. Some pending reform proposals recognize this, along with
various other limitations of the existing approach to FSA and related auditor liability.
B. Pending Proposals
Despite recent reforms, proposals proliferate designed either to address
underlying issues better than these reforms or to resolve issues the reforms do not
address.31 Issues relate to agency problems associated with management-auditor relations
and to auditor liability. Circulating proposals include concepts of self-auditing, warrantyauditing, and insurance-auditing. The latter is this Article’s focus, but to provide context,
consideration of certain facets of the other proposals is useful.
1. Self- Auditing — One proposal calls for changing the existing financial
reporting environment using two devices:32 (1) requiring companies to report real-time
bookkeeping information on publicly-accessible Web sites (including real-time journal
entries, ledger summaries, monthly aggregations and so on) and (2) requiring
management to respond publicly to questions concerning this information. The theory of
this substantive transparency (not mere disclosure) is to equip investors having requisite
interest and resources to perform their own financial statement audits of companies, or
engage their own auditor to do so.
Appealing about this concept of self-auditing is its character as self-insurance.
But numerous practical problems appear. First, supplied information is raw bookkeeping
data and limited questionnaire access to management; neither investors nor their auditors
have access to a company’s system of internal control, audit committees, walk-through
exercises, or other essential resources used in traditional auditing. Second, it is doubtful
that such deep transparency is in the best interests of corporations or investors.33 Third,

31

For example, not all non-audit services are restricted, and may be performed with audit
committee pre-approval, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. at ___, 15 U.S.C. § ____; and a proposal to mandate audit firm rotation was
deferred, see supra note 15.

32

Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the Market’s Dependence on Independence: An Alternative
to the ‘Independent’ Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 347 (2004)
[hereinafter, Chan, Breaking the Market’s Dependence].
33

See Udo C. Brändle & Jürgen Noll, A Fig Leaf for the Naked Corporation?,
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=523102 (2004) (making the specific case
against utter transparency in corporate financial reporting); see generally Troy A.
Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities
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the result would require enormous investor coordination and/or result in numerous
separate investor-audits, generating wasteful duplicative costs.
Accordingly, while self-insurance through self-auditing can mitigate risks of
financial misstatements, it can neither minimize costs nor maximize risk reduction that
can be achieved by other means, old and new.34 The proposal’s key value is its core
insight that the challenge of auditing, however designed, is to address unavoidable but
manageable risks, quintessentially the mission of insurance markets over thousands of
years.35
2. Warranty-Auditing — Pending reform proposals also appreciate that the core
of auditing is an insurance concept, looking to liability aspects of auditing to refashion
FSA to resemble an insurance model. Subject to adjustment in these proposals are the
standard of auditor performance and the measure of auditor damages for audit failure.
While hinting at the insurance element in auditing, these proposals are better described as
warranty-auditing as they use a level of auditor promise matched by designated
reimbursement levels for breach.
As to the standard of performance, one approach would move towards a strict or
stricter auditor liability regime to replace the more modulated current system containing a
mix of negligence-based and fraud-based liability theories.36 A stricter liability regime,
for example, would expose auditors to liability in all audit failure cases except when they
can show a reasonable basis, after investigation, for believing their opinions about
managerial assertions were true.37 A strict liability regime would impose absolute auditor
liability for audit failure, eliminating this due diligence defense entirely.38
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2003) (expressing more general reservations). This
concern is wholly apart from protecting proprietary information that would necessarily be
covered by such a proposal. See Chan, supra note 32, at 391-92.
34

Somewhat related to the concept of self-auditing is a concept of statutory auditing
appearing in European financial reporting systems. Statutory auditors are appointed from
within the corporation, are monitored by shareholders, enjoy statutory protections and
face statutory liabilities. See Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors' Incentives, 35
CONN. L REV. 989, 1009-10 (2003) (evaluating this concept and its inherent limitations
as best suited for companies with concentrated shareholders, unlike typical US
companies).
35

See ROBERT JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (3d ed. 2002), at 20-24 (noting
crude forms of insurance dating to the Code of Hammurabit around 2250 B.C., spreading
across civilizations among Egyptians, Chinese and Greeks, and flourishing beginning in
17th century England).
36

See supra Part I.A.4, text accompanying notes 26 to 30.

37

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 354 (2004) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper
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As for the measure of damages, proposals range from an ex ante agreement
between issuers and auditors for auditors to share a statutorily-specified minimum
percentage of total losses from audit failure;39 to a regulatory mandate that auditor
liability be determined as a specified multiple of the auditor’s average annual revenue
from the engagement.40
These proposals follow a long scholarly and policy tradition of attempting to
calibrate liability to optimal performance, avoiding excessive liability while also
deterring inadequate investigation.41 Two broad issues show modest likelihood of
achieving the optimal balance, due to inherent indeterminacy in the capacity such models
have to achieve ideal calibration.42
Failure and Reform] (contemplating that auditor must prove as an affirmative defense it
had, after reasonable investigation, grounds to believe and did believe its audit opinion
was true, effectively shifting the burden in all Section 10(b) actions to prove nonnegligence and good faith).
38

See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict
Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540-46 (2001) [hereinafter Partnoy, Barbarians
at the Gatekeepers].
39

Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers, supra note 38, at 540 (“Congress should
[amend the securities laws] to enable experts [including auditors] to specify the range of
liability as a percentage of the issuer’s liability, subject to a specified minimum
percentage”).

40

Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 37, at 349-53.

41

Debate has evolved from director and officer liability to “gatekeeper” liability. On the
former, see Alfred F. Conrad, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors’ Liability for
Negligence, 1972 DUKE L. J. 895 (capping negligence-based director liability at oneyears’ salary and outlawing indemnification and insurance); Joseph Bishop, Sitting Ducks
and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078, 1091-94 (1968) (banning coverage for conduct worse than
negligence). As for the label “gatekeeper,” though widely used in recent years, it has
neither analytical utility nor legal significance. See supra note 5.
42

A more narrow point concerns whether contractual or regulatory mechanisms are
superior. To the extent issuers and auditors contract for auditors to indemnify issuers no
peculiar contract law issues arise. However, to the extent these contracts may be seen as
stipulating damages auditors owe upon breach of an audit-engagement agreement, they
may be evaluated as penalties and unenforceable rather than liquidated damages and
enforceable. Specifying the difference would be essential to optimizing the model, rather
than rely on existing judicial mechanisms to draw the distinction. See Aaron S. Edlin &
Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 33 (2003). Related
enabling legislation may be prudent to clarify this. This point reflects the frequent, but
14

The first concerns performance standards. Devotees of strict liability cite as
advantages ease of adjudication.43 Attractive as this may be, real-world professional
assignments in varying contexts justify tailored liability standards.44 This is particularly
the case for auditing, which involves complex tasks and difficult judgments, and where
audit failure may be due to a range of circumstances from deft managerial concealment to
outright auditor complicity. The complex system of liability standards appearing in the
federal securities laws may better calibrate particularized contexts to requisite standards
of obligation than any singular standard of obligation, strict liability included.
The second concerns measuring damages. One alternative anchors in traditional
tort concepts designed to deter volitional audit failure by internalizing externalities.
Liability is a portion of total damages. This captures private costs as well as social costs.
The other alternative anchors in concepts of prevention by setting liability according to
expected private gain. Auditor liability is a multiple of related audit revenues. The
alternatives show difficult trade-offs. The ideal is further constrained by risks of
bankrupting liable auditors, the threat of which may drive firms to exit the audit- services
market.45 The alternatives also must recognize risks of excessive compensation balanced
against the need to deter and prevent, a notoriously difficult balancing challenge.46

often overlooked, blurriness of distinctions between contractual or regulatory reform
proposals.
43

E.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 37, at n. 144 (citing STEVEN
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-18 (1987)); Frank Partnoy, Strict
Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 365, 367 n. 13
(2004) [hereinafter, Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers] (citing STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 8-9 (1987)).
44

See Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 U.S.C. L. REV. 53, ___ (2003); Reinier H.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 53, ___ (1986).
45

Compare Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 37, at 346-54
(prescribing damages measured as multiple of audit-engagement revenues to reduce risk
of excessive liability threatening auditor bankruptcy and market unraveling) with
Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers, supra note 43, at 373-74 (contending that
damages measured as percentage of total losses would not pose meaningful bankruptcy
risks).
46

See Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 639 (1996) [hereinafter Langevoort, Capping Damages] (reviewing
existing literature and law to evaluate, for non-privity federal securities fraud cases,
potentially appropriate types of liability caps and damages formulae).
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Appealing about such proposals is the attempt to tailor liability risks to particular
audit engagements. This is a marked improvement over a system where auditors use
general malpractice liability insurance to cover all engagements, without tailoring to
particular audit engagement risk. To this extent, the proposals enhance the probable
effectiveness of auditor-liability risk to promote optimal auditing practice.
Unaddressed, however, are the more fundamental tensions associated with the
traditional FSA tripartite arrangement. The proposals do not confront conflict or capture
risks. They likely represent improvements over traditional financial statement auditing
and associated liability and remedy standards, but more by assuaging symptoms than
curing disease. Conquering underlying problems of conflicts and capture is a key design
feature of insurance auditing.47
C. Insurance-Auditing
Financial statement insurance (FSI) can be created as an optional alternative to
traditional financial statement auditing, as it exists or with performance and damages
standards adjusted as just discussed. Public companies would be required to use either
FSA or FSI, though not both.48 Providing registrants this option enables more effective
self-tailoring of the financial reporting and assurance process.49 It offers an alternative
holding greater promise of relieving underlying conflict and capture risks that limit the

47

Proponents note how their proposed concepts move the traditional auditing framework
towards an insurance model. E.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note
37, at 349 (auditor becomes “functional equivalent of an insurer”); Partnoy, Strict
Liability for Gatekeepers, supra note 43, at 365 (auditors “would behave more like
insurers”). FSI makes the move complete.
48

Several commentators interpreted the original FSI proposal sketched in Ronen, PostEnron Reform, supra note 4, to require public companies to adopt FSI. E.g., Coffee,
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 37, at 364, n. 101; McCoy, Realigning
Auditors’ Incentives, supra note 34, at 1010; Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria
in the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 7
(2002) [hereinafter Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria]. The proposal developed here
treats FSI as an alternative option to FSA. It is possible to read Dr. Ronen’s original
proposal as making FSI optional as well, though Dr. Ronen does not specifically address
this question. See Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 50; infra Part I.C.1
(discussing shareholder approval mechanism and effects as part of FSI origination
process).
49

See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916 (1998)
(providing comprehensive economic analysis of the role of intermediaries in markets to
show conditions under which self-tailored private contracting for performance levels and
associated liability for failure can be superior to traditional law-supplied default
provisions, with a short particular example for underwriters of public securities).
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efficacy of third-party financial statement attestations central to bridging corporate
structure’s separation of ownership from control.
FSI would alter the existing principal-agent relationship in FSA’s traditional
principal-agent-beneficiary triangle.50 Under FSI, a company buys insurance covering a
given set of financial statements,51 paying a premium, and an insurer engages an auditor
to assess risk and establish coverage. When losses occur, the insurer pays the covered
third parties, up to the amount of policy coverage.52 The FSI model would include
disclosure of the premium and coverage, intended to provide information concerning
financial statement reliability. A key attraction is the resulting numerical granularity:
small premiums with large coverage versus large premiums with small coverage,
signaling superior or inferior financial statement reliability.
FSI moves auditors into the liability background. Auditors become insurer
employees, and subject to termination by them, as well as to legal claims by insurers for
breach of contract, negligence, fraud and other cognizable transgressions. FSI differs
from the warranty-auditing proposals by setting auditor public liability at zero and
establishing insurance coverage in its place. FSI would also cover damages assessed
against the issuer itself. However, FSI would not alter the liability position of any other
existing actor in the financial reporting process, including officers, directors, underwriters
and attorneys.53 Thus, for example, officers and directors falsely certifying financial
statements remain exposed to direct liability and to forfeiture of bonuses and salaries
received during periods covered by materially misstated financials.54
50

See Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at ___.

51

The reason this is described as financial statement insurance is that existing insurance
is available generally to cover entities and directors and officers for certain securities law
violations, though not designed specifically for claims of financial misstatements. See
infra Part II.A.1-2.
52

Payment is subject to deductibles and other forms of self-insurance, as well as all other
potential limitations of contract and insurance law applicable to a policy, considered in
Part II below.
53

See McCoy, Realigning Auditors' Incentives, supra note 34, at 1010-11 (noting
importance of retaining managerial liability when using FSI). Professor McCoy believes,
for FSI to work, would require damages caps at the policy- coverage level or else insurers
are exposed to investor claims like negligent hiring or supervision. This recommendation
in effect combines a feature of warranty-auditing proposals discussed above with this
embedded feature of FSI. As for attorneys and underwriters, these professionals do not
prepare or certify the financial statements that FSI would cover.
54

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes forfeiture of executive bonuses when a company
must restate its financials due to misconduct producing material noncompliance with
financial reporting requirements. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 304, Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. ____. Executives must repay bonuses and stock options
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FSI may ease a variety of other public policy challenges besetting effective
regulation of the financial reporting process in recent decades. For example, FSI uses
devices that could, in theory, eliminate regulatory concern about and needs for auditor
independence and oversight that form the basis for recent reforms. FSI could enable
insurers to decide questions concerning auditor independence, including other services
auditors could provide to insured audit clients, and how frequently firms or lead partners
should be rotated through audit cycles to minimize capture risks. On the other hand,
some such concerns could reappear under FSI in different form, leading, for example, to
the need for companies to rotate FSI carriers and for insurer independence from insureds.
These issues warrant evaluation, for while FSI does not offer perfection, it has
clear conceptual appeal. Moreover, the concept—first sketched by NYU accounting
professor Joshua Ronen in a dozen pages of text at a law school symposium—has not
been given a close or comprehensive critique, but deserves one.55 The following analysis
uses Dr. Ronen’s innovative sketch as a springboard, both evaluating the initial proposal
and interpreting and extending it as necessary to enable reaching an overall preliminary
assessment of FSI’s efficacy.
1. Security-Holder Approval — A company wishes to consider buying FSI.56 It
contacts insurance carriers.57 The company requests an insurance proposal from carriers,
received for the year after the incorrect report was made, along with any profits generated
on such awards during that year. Id. FSI would not change this. The Act requires CEOs
and CFOs to certify periodic SEC reports as fully complying with applicable securities
laws and that financial statements fairly present condition and results. Id., §§ 302 & 906.
They must certify that they designed corporate internal controls to promote reliable
financial reporting, disclosed discovered control irregularities to outside audit ors and
board audit committee, as well as any fraud involving employees with significant internal
control roles. Id., § 302; see also id. § 401 (concerning auditor attestations of such
managerial assertions). FSI would not change the legal consequences of violations of
these provisions.
55

Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4. A handful of legal commentators have
noted the FSI concept and provided passing remarks, but none has developed a full-scale
analysis. See sources cited supra note 48. While this Article will not be able to conduct
an exhaustive definitive analysis, it is intended to present a sufficiently comprehensive
analysis to provide preliminary conclusions about FSI’s efficacy and prescriptions
necessary to facilitate its use.
56

Company desire may originate with management or through shareholder voice
exercised using devices such as SEC Rule 14a-8. For corporations, this would require
board of director approval, and provision could be made to require internal company
approval from audit committees meeting applicable federal securities law requirements.
57

Companies seeking competitive bids would contact several alternative insurers; for
most companies, the insurers would select one of the several large (or handful of
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stating maximum coverage sought and contemplated premium (as well as lesser coverage
amounts and associated premiums). Coverage would bear a relation to the company’s
average market capitalization, reflecting risks that public market valuations based on
reported financial statements are mistaken due to misstated financials.58 This proposal is
made before a company’s annual proxy statement is circulated (so, for a company
reporting on a calendar basis, in November or December of the year before the year
coverage will apply; call this Year-X-1).59
The carrier engages an auditor. The auditor performs a preliminary review of the
company and its internal-control and external-competitive environment and other
relevant factors.60 On the basis of this investigation, carriers furnish proposals,
specifying coverage, premium and other policy terms. With one or more insurance
proposals in hand, management decides whether to select one. If it does, the company
discloses related material information in its proxy statement circulated during the year
coverage is contemplated (call it Year-X).
Adoption of FSI is put to a shareholder vote.61 This is designed principally to
enable shareholder determination of whether the company should use FSI or adhere to
medium-sized) auditors. The total costs of the search would rationally be less than gains
achieved from resulting premium-coverage mix payoffs. Some risk of an insurer race to
the bottom appears. Insurers might be averse to writing policies for high-risk companies,
but they also want to generate premium volume. Similar problems to FSA appear:
competition driving the industry to use lenient auditors to generate premium volume
instead of using optimal auditors whose review may reduce premium volume. See Chan,
Breaking the Market’s Dependence, supra note 32, at 370 (noting that under FSI insurers
avoid high-risk companies but face incentives to generate premium volume that could
provoke a race to the bottom). This risk is real but is likely less severe than among
auditors under FSA. Insurers sign on for the express purpose of providing payouts on
particular audit engagements and are empowered to retain, supervise and terminate
auditors; auditors primarily engage to render audits and related opinions, and are hired by
the company (whether by its management or audit committee). Even so, resulting insurer
insolvency risk requires attention, given in Part III below.
58

59

See infra Part II.B.1.
Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 50.

60

Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 49 (noting factors to examine, including
industry competition and health; company reputation, financial condition and results; and
company operating structure, control environment and accounting policies).
61

Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 50. The carrier’s proposal is expressly
conditional on both a favorable investor vote and the auditor issuing an unqualified audit
opinion as discussed below. Contract formation follows a traditional contracting model,
with no pre-contractual insurer liability except to direct the audit. Compare Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Pre-Contractual Reliance, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 423 (2001);
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FSA. Those not opting for FSI would effectively opt for FSA; those opting for FSI
would be relieved of federal securities law obligations to have financial statements
audited under the traditional framework (and federal securities laws would be amended to
enable this).62
This voting mechanism is desirable as a way to provide shareholder choice.
Issues arise for companies with capital structures including more than a single class of
common stock (that is, most companies). Who should be entitled to vote? No doubt
voting common shareholders should be included. What about other security holders? All
security holders have an interest in reliable financial statements, and hence FSI, including
debt holders and shareholders not otherwise eligible to vote on various matters. Probably
the best way to address this issue is to specify in debt instruments or corporate charters
whether particular creditors or other claimants are entitled to vote on such matters.63
A related issue concerns effects of security holder approval. At minimum,
approval would relieve the registrant of obligations to provide FSA in the traditional
manner (as amended federal securities laws would expressly permit). More difficult is
whether it should also limit investor recoveries against auditors or issuers for financial
misstatements to the amount of coverage stipulated in the FSI policy. In theory, at least,
a proxy vote manifests security-holder notice and knowledge of approved proposals and
the effects could be designated as binding.64 This assumes reliable conquering of rational
apathy and collective action problems afflicting all shareholder decision-making in

see also Ronald J. Mann, Contracts with Consent: A Contextual Critique of the NoRetraction Liability Regime, 153 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2004).
62

Procuring insurance is within a board’s power with or without shareholder approval
under state corporation law. E.g., 8 Del. C. §§ 121 & 122(13) (corporation powers); §141
(boards manage the business and affairs of the corporation); Model Bus. Corp. Act § ___.
Providing for shareholder approval is designed to address federal securities law
requirements relating to auditor attestation of financial statements. Federal securities law
amendments permitting FSI would include provisions establishing minimum federal
standards for the content of FSI policies, as discussed in Part II.
63

FSI would thus not foreclose debates about other constituencies, from creditors to
labor. E.g., Kent Greenfield, The Unjustified Absence of Federal Fraud Protection in the
Labor Market, 107 YALE L.J. 715 (1997).
64

Compare Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 58 (treating shareholder approval
as an implicit contractual agreement that should have the effect of limiting any recoveries
to the FSI policy limits, particularly given holders were on notice and assuming that
related policy coverage would be priced into the security under the semi-strong form of
the efficient market hypothesis).
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corporate governance. State courts, at least, have not treated shareholder approval as
guaranteeing any particular result in subsequent litigation.65
In this context, however, abundant policy analysis supports the concern that
damages awards for many accounting-related claims overcompensate and imperfectlydeter.66 This makes a strong case for a firm legal principle so limiting damages from the
auditor and issuer, particularly when these are determined using a market-based and
publicly-disclosed mechanism such as FSI, accompanied by minimum federal standards.
It would not, moreover, preclude recovery from persons other than the auditor, issuer or
FSI carrier, so that directors, officers, attorneys and underwriters would remain
potentially liable.67
For the shareholder (or security holder) vote, the proxy statement disclosure and
ballot would offer three choices: (1) take the maximum offered coverage, paying the
related premium; (2) take lower levels management recommends; or (3) take no
insurance.68 For companies opting to take no insurance, traditional FSA procedures and
related liability rules remain in place for that year.69 For companies opting for one of the
insurance alternatives, the next step is for the insurer to engage an auditor to conduct a
full audit of the company’s Year-X financial statements.
2. The Audit Condition — For companies opting into FSI coverage, the audit plan
is developed, for the fiscal year in which the related vote is held and for which coverage
is contemplated (that is, Year-X). The audit plan is designed by the auditor, subject to
insurer oversight,70 and the audit for Year-X conducted and concluded in the early months
65

See, e.g., Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) (noting four possible
consequences of shareholder ratification of an interested-director transaction under
Delaware corporation law: no effect deserving judicial recognition given collective action
problems; insulating the transaction from judicial review completely; shifting the judicial
test from fairness to waste; or shifting the burden of proof from directors to
shareholders).
66

See Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 46; McCoy, Realigning Auditors’
Incentives, supra note 34; supra note 53.
67

Part II.B.2 considers the relationship between FSI policies and directors’ and officers’
insurance policies when both types apply to a single claim.

68

Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 50-51.

69

The warranty-auditing proposals discussed in Part I.B.2 remain potentially attractive
for this class of issuers.
70

See Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 51 & 55 (referring at page 51 to
cooperative audit planning between the auditor and “the reviewer,” presumably meaning
“insurer” and referring at page 55 to the insurer).
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of the following year (call it Year-X+1). The FSI policy contains a condition making it
effective only if the auditor gives an unqualified financial statement audit opinion.
Otherwise, the policy does not become effective and the company remains subject to the
FSA regime and all related liability rules.
A difficulty arises when holders have voted for FSI but the audit condition of an
unqualified audit opinion is not met. In Dr. Ronen’s initial FSI proposal, the insurer and
the company would negotiate anew, if they desired, with whether they are likely to do so
depending on why the auditor could not issue an unqualified opinion. In fact, the
outcome seems a bit more complex at this point. On one hand, investors have voted
either for the maximum FSI coverage or for management’s lower recommendation. For a
renegotiated policy on other terms, management lacks investor authorization to agree to a
policy. It could seek new approval using a special shareholder meeting or consent
solicitation but these are cumbersome and time-consuming compared to the time likely
available.
On the other hand, absence of an unqualified audit opinion signals financial
statement irregularities discovered in the audit, suggesting reason for investor concern
about managerial integrity and reliability. If the opinion is adverse or qualified in ways
suggesting severe accounting irregularities, investors likely hold credible legal claims
against management and other parties, though not against auditors since they are blowing
the whistle. If so, insurers are unlikely to issue a policy, any policy likely would be
unenforceable as a matter of insurance law,70A and it doesn’t really matter at this point
whether a policy or the default model applies: the liability of these parties is not
influenced by the presence or absence of FSI. In cases where the auditor’s opinion is
qualified for limited reasons, however, whether FSI is procured could still matter for the
scope of the auditor’s liability.
This raises a subtle structural issue, concerning the fact that auditors when
engaged under FSI do not know whether, ultimately, FSI or FSA will govern their
engagement and liability. If auditors face different incentives and pressure under FSA
compared to FSI, then the possibility that either regime may apply, determined after they
complete the audit, could influence audit quality and conclusions. Knowing FSA applies
yields conflict and capture pressure with a resulting level of investigation and diligence;
knowing FSI applies neutralizes those pressures and instead creates insurer-backed
incentives for superior auditor investigation and diligence. Under FSI, auditors enter the
engagement as insurer-employees, and assume an FSI framework. But they also know
that, if they don’t issue an unqualified opinion, their performance is governed by the FSA
model.71 What effect will this have on their incentives in performing the audit?
70A

See Part II.A.1 (discussing insurance law’s fortuity requirement that limits insurable
risks to those uncertain to occur).
71

As a resulting contracting matter, issuers applying to insurers for FSI and contracting
with them would also need to contract with the insurer-designated auditor to provide that
the auditor is automatically and retroactively deemed engaged by the issuer if the FSI
policy does not become effective. In addition, when FSI audits do not result in the FSI
22

The sequence should yield expected behavior concordant with the FSI model, not
the FSA model, no matter what the audit’s outcome. The comfort that FSI shifts liability
to insurers away from auditors creates pressure for auditors to deliver unqualified
opinions. But this bias will be offset in two ways: first, audit failure still exposes auditors
to liability to insurers for professional transgressions and second, as insurer employees,
the insurer will not allow auditors to provide unqualified opinions unless the insurer is
comfortable with this conclusion. In addition, absence of an unqualified opinion means
auditors are potentially primarily liable, and this likely will lead them in writing such
opinions towards more conservative assessments. The combination of factors, therefore,
should encourage FSI auditors to work with management to pressure it into producing
financial statements faithfully reflecting business reality warranting an unqualified
opinion. Management unwilling to meet auditor demands, which will thus be
considerable, could find themselves without an auditor or insurance.
Moving beyond these subtleties associated with an FSI auditor issuing other than
an unqualified opinion, consider the case of companies opting for FSI and earning an
unqualified FSI audit opinion. They are covered by an effective FSI policy (the FSI
proposal provides that insurance becomes effective when the condition of earning an
unqualified audit opinion is satisfied). The audit report, issued in Year-X+1, includes a
paragraph disclosing coverage associated with the Year-X financial statements and
related premium;72 accompanying managerial disclosure provides material information
concerning policy details.73 FSI then substitutes for auditor and issuer liability for
material financial misstatements for Year-X, approved by investor vote in that year, and
taking effect in Year-X+1.74
Investors may prefer FSI over FSA because of its prospects for providing superior
audits. Insurance auditing may be superior to FSA because it more nearly aligns auditor
interests with investor interests. Under FSA, auditors face pressure to succumb to
management preferences, either due to judgment inherent in accounting or to

policy becoming effective, the company would be charged with reimbursing the insurer
for all its out-of-pocket costs, including audit fees. This is akin to the binder in insurance
parlance, though differs in that no insurance is provided unless the audit condition is met
or the parties successfully renegotiate.
72

Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 51. This requires amending generally
accepted auditing standards to achieve, a step that would require the blessing of PCAOB.
Dr. Ronen does not discuss amending GAAS (or federal securities laws), though he does
discuss how FSI relates to various theoretical amendments to GAAP. Id., at 56 ff.

73

Ensuing discussion in this and the next Part identify subjects requiring disclosure.

74

These effects pose consequences for the terms of the policy, particularly meaning it
must be an occurrence rather than a claims-made policy, discussed in Part II.A.3.
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disincentives from conflict or capture to counter this pressure.75 While FSI cannot alter
the challenge of accounting’s inherent judgment, it can alter the pressure-dynamics
between management and auditors. A key difference is that auditors are employed by
insurers, not companies. Absence of conflict and capture risks should heighten auditor
willingness to second-guess management and not give it the benefit of the doubt.
FSI auditing superiority compared to FSA likely remains despite improvements
under SOX
. V esting audit committees with auditor retention, supervision and
termination authority may incrementally reduce capture risk. Under either system,
however, auditors plan and perform audits to maximize their expected compensation.76
When auditors are paid by companies under FSA, at stake is a single engagement; when
auditors are paid by insurers under FSI, at stake is a portfolio of engagements sponsored
by the insurer. This difference should lead to superior audit quality using FSI compared
to FSA.
Other recent reforms may contribute more significantly to FSA quality, compared
to FSI. Consider the new control audit feature of FSA. Like FSI, it is designed to
provide a gauge of financial statement reliability, though in somewhat different terms
than FSI. In control audits, the mechanism is an audit report on internal control over
financial reporting and the timing is prospective: the opinion states whether effective
control was maintained during the previous accounting period with a view towards
assessing the reliability of future financial statements.76A With FSI, the signal is the
premium/coverage mix and the timing is historical: a risk assessment concerning the
likelihood that the most recent financial statements are reliable.
Which of these signaling devices is superior is difficult to gauge. Both devices
can produce kindred improvements compared to traditional FSA. First, both use a
publicly-disclosed mechanism to pressure management to improve financial reporting
reliability (the control-audit report and premium-coverage signal, respectively). Second,
both are designed to promote superior audits by encouraging greater emphasis on
verifying critical data such as assets and revenues rather than the more traditional
mechanical sampling of various journal entries.77 On the other hand, control audits and
75

Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 55-56. Reform proposals addressing
auditor performance or liability mute the concept of auditor professional skepticism.
Perhaps the audit failures of the late 1990s and early 2000 render reference to this
professional doctrine naïve. In the era of enhanced auditor independence and oversight,
and certainly under FSI, the concept’s value should reappear. On the concept of auditor
professional skepticism, see DAVID N. RICCHIUTE, AUDITING AND ASSURANCE SERVICES
(7th ed. 2003), ___.
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Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 57.
See Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System, supra note 24.
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See AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, supra note 25; Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note
4, at 55. Verification exercises are more costly and cumbersome than sampling
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FSI are not mutually exclusive: one could insure current financials using FSI and not care
whether controls were effective, but knowing that controls are effective remains useful to
forecasting future financial statement reliability. As a result, the new control-audit
regime does not preempt FSI, and control auditing can be performed by auditors
governed by FSI.
A final issue concerning FSI’s audit condition relates to insurer incentives to
conceal rather than to expose accounting irregularities. Given that FSI policy issuance is
conditioned on an unqualified audit opinion, the insurer’s incentive for any given year
should be to discover, correct and/or disclose all irregularities. But opposite incentives
may arise for concealment in subsequent periods.78 An FSI audit for a given year, say
Year-X1, poses incentives to discover, correct and/or disclose all irregularities; but YearX2 may bring opposite pressure to conceal irregularities the auditor failed to discover
during Year-X1. Auditors face similar pressure when engaged under FSA to perform
successive annual audits for the same company. The issue becomes whether concealment
incentives would differ under FSI or whether analogous insurer-rotation mechanisms
should apply. Several constraints applicable to insurers under FSI appear stronger than
those applicable to auditors under FSA, which should neutralize such insurer temptation
to conceal.
First, each annual FSI review and premium-coverage quote are made anew, and
insurers face pressure in Year-X2’s quote to reflect realities of Year-X1’s audit, whether or
not discovered irregularities were previously disclosed. Second, insurers are removed
from the internal cultural motif that engenders accounting irregularities. That should
equip them more fully than auditors under FSA to recognize the inevitable public
discovery of accounting irregularities. Third, insurers enjoy a professional inclination as
actuaries to see that accounting irregularities snowball with time, creating larger loss
payout exposure the longer disclosure is deferred.79 While these neutralizing effects are
imperfect, they are not inferior to those auditors face under FSA, and may be
incrementally superior.
3. Premium-Coverage and Related Disclosure — FSI’s key informationgeneration is the premium-coverage mix, which has value to the extent public capital

techniques but are likely more useful; they are implicitly mandated by the new control
audit regime and substantially encouraged by insurer oversight of auditors under FSI.
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Compare Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 37, at n. 151 (identifying
as a problem with Dr. Ronen’s FSI proposal that the “insurer might prefer that the auditor
hide, rather than reveal, accounting irregularities discovered after the insurance policy
was issued, if their revelation would trigger its obligation to pay under its policy”).
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Remaining insurer incentives to hide later-discovered irregularities triggering coverage
may be addressed by mechanisms used in the claims process, discussed further in Parts
I.C.4 and II.C.
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markets are somewhat efficient.80 According to Dr. Ronen, FSI meets conditions of a
signaling equilibrium.81 While premium amount varies with coverage level, for a given
coverage level, premiums vary inversely with quality (positively with assessed risk).
Optimality is reinforced by higher-quality risk assessment and audit. Likewise, for a
given premium, coverage varies positively with quality (negatively with assessed risk).
As a result, premium-coverage disclosure provides credible market signals, enabling
meaningful inter-company comparisons. Dr. Ronen opines that, to the extent of market
efficiency, the signals are accurately priced.82
FSI thus uses disclosure as a critical dimension to reveal a financial statement
reliability index, with consequent pressure on management to enhance reporting quality
and on auditors to apply that pressure.83 While the premium-coverage mix is an
integrated expression of risk, numerous other insurance policy terms can be used to adjust
risk in ways that alter the premium-coverage mix.84 Policy terms vary considerably in the
corporate-liability line of the insurance business, which uses extensive endorsements and
80

Dr. Ronen assumes semi-strong form efficiency. Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra
note 4, at 57. Specific assumptions of market efficiency should not be a condition to
accepting FSI’s efficacy. So long as consumers of financial information treat the
information as important to their investment decisions and make decisions informed by
the information, it is useful without regard to how swiftly or accurately the trading
decisions of active traders incorporate such information into trading prices. In other
words, even efficiency skeptics (including this author) might find FSI appealing. See
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546
(1994) (critique of efficient market hypothesis using chaos theory and noise theory);
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 767 (2002) (critique of efficient market hypothesis using noise theory and
prospect theory); but see Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (still the leading statement by leading
corporate law scholars on market efficiency despite many critiques).
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Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 58; compare supra note 80 (efficiency
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For example, the premium-coverage mix will vary with the identity, claims-paying
capabilities and reputation of the insurer (such as size and attitude towards defending or
settling claims), as well as applicable state law governing the policy. Tailored
endorsements cover a wide range of issues, including: self-insurance requirements
(through coinsurance, deductibles, and retentions); excess or primary coverage;
indemnity-only versus defend policies; and various administrative provisions relating to
the claims process. See Part II, infra.
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policy tailoring rather than rely on standardized forms as in most insurance lines.85 While
some standardization will be desirable to promote FSI’s efficacy and some will be
required (as discussed in the next Part), tailored terms are inevitable. Disclosure of
tailored terms will be necessary to enable accurate interpretation of the premiumcoverage mix.
Such contractual tailoring can offer a potential advantage of FSI compared to
FSA, including proposals to modify auditor liability: exploiting market forces to set
coverage, premium and other policy terms. Market effects channel premium-setting to
maximize the accuracy of the premium calibrated to probability and magnitude of loss.
Market forces constrain premiums in two directions: competition pressures insurers
towards minimizing premiums (knowing competitors will outbid them) and selfpreservation pressures insurers towards maximizing premiums to meet claims.86 The net
effect is toward premium accuracy that in turn drives optimal incentives for auditors to
apply optimal pressure on managers to produce reliable financial statements.
FSI’s contractual structure is congruent with objectives of federal securities
regulation. Key objectives are deterrence and prevention, with additional goals of
compensating losses of misled investors. FSI follows this pattern, emphasizing
prevention first and compensation second.87 FSI also aligns with the deterrence rationale
and traditional SEC opposition to indemnification mechanisms in favor of insurance that
adds resources to compensate investor losses.88 In addition to FSI’s structural
85

JOHN F. OLSON, JOSIAH O. HATCH, III & TY R. SAGALOW, DIRECTOR AND OFFICER
LIABILITY: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE §12.17 (2003) (“Unlike many other
insurance forms, D&O policies have varied to such an extent in their particulars that the
Insurance Service Organization (ISO) has never attempted to file a ‘standard policy form’
[, the Surety Association of America recently decided not to do so] and each insured has
continued to use a slightly different policy as its basic form. . . .[A] D&O policy begins to
look more like a negotiated commercial agreement than an ‘off-the-shelf insurance’
form.”).
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Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 53. Inefficiencies, such as short-time
horizons, producing excessively low premiums (market skimming), can occur in other
insurance markets. To permit FSI as an alternative to FSA would require federal comfort
that state insurance-law mechanisms or insurance markets are sufficient to minimize
these risks to acceptable levels. See Part III. In addition, market forces relating to policy
terms would be supported by minimum federal standards requiring qualifying FSI
policies to contain certain terms. See Part II.
87

This feature is in common with the auditor-liability proposal establishing quasi-strict
auditor liability measuring damages as a multiple of related audit revenue. See Coffee,
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 37.
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For example, a longstanding SEC policy opposes using indemnification for officers and
directors for violations of the Securities Act of 1933. The rationale is an interpretation of
that Act as intended more to promote managerial diligence through deterrence and
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congruence with federal securities regulation, various contract terms can be tailored to
meet public-policy objectives, as discussed in detail in the next Part of this Article.89
4. Claims — Relevant to evaluating the relative merits of FSA versus FSI are the
processes used to determine, measure and pay recoveries for losses. Traditional FSA
relies upon civil litigation. Debate rages as to the quality of this mechanism in delivering
all related policy goals, including deterrence, prevention and compensation. Plaintiffs’
lawyers are major beneficiaries of the regime, and whether these and other investorprotection goals are optimized is unclear.90
Also unclear is exactly how efficient any claims process using FSI would be. In
his FSI proposal, Dr. Ronen sketches a claims-settlement process of the most attractive
kind. It differs markedly from standard securities law litigation, as well as from existing
insurance-claim processes. At the outset in Dr. Ronen’s model (presumably as part of the
FSI policy itself), the insurer and insured “cooperatively select a fiduciary
organization.”91 This “fiduciary organization” is unspecified,92 but its tasks are to assess
claims, notify the insurer of claims, and represent investor interests.93
prevention than to provide recompense. See Bishop, supra note 41, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153,
1162 (quoting SEC brief in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. to the effect that
the 1933 Act rationale was less to provide compensation than to “stimulate diligence on
the part of those persons who are actually responsible for the preparation of registration
statements”); see generally 17 C.F.R. § 229.510 (stating current SEC policy, including
requiring registrants to disclose in registration statements that they have been advised of
this policy).
89

Part II gives numerous examples of provisions that federal securities law permitting
FSI likely would require to be contained in FSI policies in order for them to qualify as
legitimate alternatives to FSA.
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See David L. Gilbertson & Steven D. Avila, The Plaintiffs' Decision to Sue Auditors in
Securities Litigation: Private Enforcement or Opportunism?, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 681
(1999); see also Adam C. Pritchard, Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action
Reform?, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 471, at 12-14 (Feb. 27, 2003), at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-471es.html; Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons
from Securities Regulation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533 (1997).
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Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 51.
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This concept historically was used to describe mutual funds and certain other kinds of
institutional investors. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW
DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959), at 59. No doubt this would
assume a different meaning in the FSI context, though Dr. Ronen does not specify its
meaning or illustrate candidates. Presumably they could be created. Cf. Elizabeth C.
Price, The Evolution of Health Care Decision-Making: The Political Paradigm and
Beyond, 65 TENN. L. REV. 619, 641 (1998) (proposing creating fiduciary organizations to
assist consumers with health-care insurance claims and disputes).
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The claims-settlement process begins when losses are claimed (financial
misstatements are alleged). Dr. Ronen does not describe how shareholders (or other
security holders) solve collective action and rational apathy problems in forming to bring
a claim. Presumably, this follows the traditional securities law model, with large
investors acting or class action lawyers rounding up claimants. In any event, in Dr.
Ronen’s model, the fiduciary organization becomes aware of the potential claim and
notifies the insurer. At this point, Dr. Ronen indicates that the insurer and the fiduciary
would “mutually select an independent expert” to determine the claim’s validity and
amount.94 Then, Dr. Ronen concludes, “Within a short time after receiving the expert's
report, the FSI carrier compensates the fiduciary up to the face amount of the policy for
the damages.”95
Dr. Ronen obviously intends to provide a thumbnail sketch of the claims process,
hinting at perceived limitations in existing securities law litigation. In suggesting the
alternative, however, major differences between the proposed model and standard
principles of insurance law and practice appear. Insurance practice, by custom and
contract, follows a fairly rigid pattern. In the traditional pattern, the insured must notify
the insurer of a claim; the insurer then investigates; the insurer becomes liable only when
the insured is held liable; the insurer typically defends the claim; and settlements are
reached or the case goes to trial. Whether FSI could be streamlined using Dr. Ronen’s
approach or be constrained to follow this traditional insurance claim model is uncertain.
Issues raised are considered in the next Part, along with other advanced insurance law
and practice matters necessary to complete this evaluation of FSI’s efficacy and its
comparative appeal to FSA.

II. FSI AS SUI GENERIS
If the foregoing structural analysis suggests FSI may be appealing, additional
intricacies of insurance law remain to be considered to confirm this appeal. The starting
point for analyzing insurance law aspects of FSI is to recognize that it is unlike any
existing type of insurance—it is sui generis.96 This may enhance its appeal, since its
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Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 51 (providing that insurer and fiduciary
organization “mutually select an independent expert to render a report as to whether there
was an omission or misrepresentation and whether it did give rise to the amount of losses
that resulted”).
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FSI is sui generis in the denotation sense of being something new under the sun,
though not necessarily in the etymological sense of being self-generating or selfsustaining. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990) (sui generis defined as
"of its own kind or class"); BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1236 (3d ed. 1969) (sui
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contours may be written more nearly on a clean slate, though constrained and tailored by
a variety of existing insurance law principles, as well as insurance market practices.
The boundaries between types of insurance are sometimes blurry or
overlapping.97 Yet classifications pose significant consequences for policy terms and
market expectations, so effort at classifying any insurance scheme is useful. This seems
particularly so for FSI, since on the surface it bears kinship to directors’ and officers’
(D&O) insurance but on closer inspection critical differences appear.
In fact, to be effective, FSI would necessarily differ from D&O insurance policies
(and related entity-level policies) in such key respects outlined below as interpreting
insurance law’s fortuity requirement (concerning the insurability of intentional acts),
evaluating traditional insurance law problems such as application fraud, and defining
policy type according to the insurance industry’s claims-made versus occurrences
distinction. Additional implications follow relating to the determination and meaning of
insurance premiums and coverage bought (for example, as to requirements for selfinsurance through deductibles and retentions) and for the claims-settlement process.
Part A below addresses the classification issue, beginning with a brief history of
D&O and entity insurance showing key ways FSI policies must differ. Parts B and C
pursue the related implications concerning premium-coverage and claims processing,
respectively, showing how practice and state insurance law must be molded to enable FSI
to work in the federal securities law context. Each illustrates in different ways three tools
for facilitating the interplay between state insurance law and insurance markets on the
one hand and federal securities regulation on the other: contract, disclosure, and some
judicial/regulatory adaptation. In each case, a federal regulatory overlay would be
necessary to enable underlying insurance principles to facilitate federal securities
regulation objectives.
A. Classification and Key Elements
D&O insurance is a form of casualty insurance, third-party insurance providing
coverage for losses that insureds incur to others. It evolved out of professional
malpractice liability insurance,98 but is more complex. Chief complexities are due to its
coverage of fiduciaries for investors in a corporation rather than of professionals

generis means "of its own kind, peculiar"); BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 495 (4th ed.
1996) (sui generis is "of its own kind”).
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E.g., KIRK A. PASICH, CASUALTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE, LEXIS BUSINESS LAW
MONOGRAPHS: INSURANCE SERIES (RELEASE NO. 75, VOL. IN2 2003), at §§ 1.01-1.02
(noting that the boundaries between casualty and property insurance often blur and that
more useful analytical categories are first-party insurance versus third-party insurance).
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30

rendering services to clients.99 In this context, it offers advantages over other resource
mechanisms, such as indemnification, by providing an additional funding source apart
from the corporation’s own balance sheet. Entity coverage is a further extension of D&O
insurance, picking up liabilities the corporation itself incurs to investors for various
wrongs. Both forms of insurance are of recent vintage, and their history has been one of
significant volatility and change.
D&O insurance was first marketed in the late 1960s, when state corporation laws
were amended specifically to authorize corporations to provide it.100 It remained
relatively rare before the 1980s, however, and thereafter began to proliferate.101 The
proliferation was slowed somewhat by two cases where directors were held personally
liable for staggering sums that their D&O insurance covered.102 The market recovered
from these shocks, in part by using more tailored contracts that expanded policy amounts
and risks covered while more effectively managing risks. Protections against frivolous
litigation provided by Congress in the late 1990s sustained market growth,103 but a
reversal occurred in the early 2000s amid a wave of large insurance settlements104 and the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks that shook all insurance markets. Readjustments
followed, with premiums increasing, coverage decreasing, and various self-insurance
requirements imposed.105
The entity-insurance variation of D&O insurance first appeared in 1996, during
the growth period in D&O insurance.106 These policies provide coverage for risks similar
99
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to those D&O policies cover but extend to liability incurred by the corporation itself.
They are separate policies from D&O policies, carrying their own premiums. The
markets tend to move in similar fashion to each other, however, and the see-saw
experience of the D&O market of the late 1990s and early 2000s applied equally to the
entity insurance market. Thus attractive policy options and terms appeared in the late
1990s (such as multi-year policies) and vanished in the early 2000s.107 Late 1990s policy
options included specific coverage for securities law claims, a feature traditionally
specifically excluded from D&O policies.108 Realized risks amid the general market
downturn led insurers substantially to curtail coverage and require greater detail in risk
assessment and exposure information before issuing policy coverage.109
Within the D&O and entity insurance markets, no specific product extends to
cases of accounting irregularities or fraud such as FSI would cover. Rather, issuers and
auditors face liability, with auditors in turn using malpractice liability insurance on an
umbrella basis to cover certain of their losses. Even those entity and D&O policies
expressly covering securities law claims are not designed or suited to deal with
accounting cases. They work in addressing conventional securities law class actions
when defendants deny deliberate wrongdoing.110 For accounting irregularities or fraud,
such denials are often by definition untenable.111 In addition, D&O and entity insurance
policies cover claims made during a particular time period, whereas FSI insures a
particular year’s financial statements, with coverage extending to discoveries made in
future periods. In insurance parlance, this means FSI is retroactive coverage, to be
provided on an “occurrence” basis.
FSI’s retroactive-coverage character suggests an affinity not to D&O insurance,
but to title insurance (strange as this at first may seem). Title insurance is coverage
concerning risks of defects in legal title to real property.112 Home sellers represent
ownership of title to buyers and, when transferring their interest, provide buyers title
107
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Federal Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 1048 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Ohio law); Bendis v. Federal
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insurance policies backstopping this representation. If the seller breaches this
representation, the insurer defends the buyer’s claim of title against third parties and pays
the buyer’s damages arising from the third party’s successful assertion against the buyer’s
title.113 FSI thus differs from title insurance, since title insurance is usually procured by a
property seller, who buys the policy by naming the property buyer as the insured.
Despite this methodological difference, FSI’s other parallels to title insurance make this
kinship stronger than FSI’s kinship with D&O or entity insurance.
Title insurance is retroactive in character in the sense that it covers matters arising
before the policy issuance date.114 FSI operates identically, covering accounting
irregularities reflected in financial statements covering a prior period.
More
conceptually, a key feature FSI and title insurance have in common is they both solve a
problem of incomplete information: in the case of title insurance, the quality of the
seller’s title, and in the case of FSI, the quality of the company’s financial statements.
D&O and entity insurance are less about incomplete information than about behavioral
and performance risks.
FSI is also akin to title insurance in economic terms. Title insurance is unusual
among insurance lines in that a substantial portion of premiums are dedicated to
investigation rather than to expected payouts-and-profits.115 The central activity in
assessing risk involves particularized investigations concerning property and transaction
character and research on filings, surveys, zonings and permit examination.116 This
contrasts with most insurance underwriting exercises, where risks are classified using
general actuarial tools rather than specific investigation. In the case of title insurance, the
result is that associated losses and legal costs range as low as 3% to 7% of total operating
income.117 FSI can be expected to perform similarly, given the substantial investigation
auditing entails and that the audit condition must be met for an FSI policy to become
effective.
This review of the conceptual kinship of FSI to other forms of insurance implies
that general criticism applicable to D&O insurance does not automatically apply to FSI.
For example, while D&O insurance may provide clues through premiums that proxy for
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corporate governance quality,118 critics observe that the D&O insurance market does not
demonstrate that insurers have any monitoring incentives, since insurers do not condition
policy issuance upon formal governance reviews or approvals.119 Such D&O insurance
limitations simply reflect a more attenuated relationship between corporate governance
quality and related liability risks.120
In contrast, audit effectiveness and auditor performance bear directly on financial
statement and reporting quality, and, under FSI, auditor review and opinions are integral
monitoring functions. Moreover, FSI provides monitoring incentives on insurers that
differ from those insurers face when underwriting auditor malpractice liability insurance
for FSA. In the latter case, umbrella policies cover a broad range of auditor activities,
including all its audit engagements. For FSI, each policy is tailored to a particular audit
engagement with associated risk, premium, coverage and other tailored policy terms.121
In addition to rendering criticism of D&O insurance inapt to FSI, this comparison
also suggests a variety of market and legal differences between these types of policies
requiring specific attention both to make FSI efficacious and to evaluate its relative
appeal compared to FSA. As noted, the key elements discussed next, and those discussed
in ensuing sections, can be addressed by a combination of three devices. As for contract
and contract interpretation,122 federal securities regulation permitting FSI as an
118
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J., July 17, 2002, at C1)).
119

Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria, supra note 48, at 7 (questioning Ronen’s FSI
proposal on this basis).
120

See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability
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alternative to FSA should require certain contractual provisions for a policy to qualify,
analogous to the approach federal securities regulation uses in the Trust Indenture Act
applicable to bond indentures.123 As for disclosure, various contract terms influence the
premium-coverage mix for given policies, and these factors are necessary to interpret
FSI’s premium-coverage signal. As for factors that cannot effectively be addressed by
contract or disclosure, specific judicial and/or market approaches would be necessary to
make FSI efficacious, as the following key examples show.
1. The Fortuity Requirement — A basic and ancient principle of insurance law
holds that losses must be “fortuitous.”124 This doctrine excludes as uninsurable those
losses an insured party causes intentionally. Accounting cases covered by FSI likely
would raise issues of intentionality. Interpretive issues arise concerning classifying
conduct and specifying the mechanisms used to make the classification conclusive.

the distinct purposes of this form of contract. Often this involves evaluating both the
insurance policy contract as written and the broader purposive context of which it is a
part. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretation of Insurance
Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 543
(1996); see also Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts, NBRE
Working Paper (Nov. 2003) (theory of contact interpretation specifying that a written
contract is basis for argument in developing interpreted contract, which is the contract to
be enforced).
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Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbb (specifying a variety of
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law”). The public policy underlying the fortuity requirement is so strong
that if the insurance policy itself does not expressly require that the loss be
accidental courts will imply such a requirement. The fortuity principle is
often expressed with reference to certainty: losses that are certain to occur,
or which have already occurred, are not fortuitous. In some jurisdictions,
the fortuity doctrine is codified [citing N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101[a] (2001);
CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (2001)].

JERRY, supra note 35, at 450-51.
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Specification of conduct type can be complex.125 Federal securities law cases
construing D&O and entity insurance policies recognize a public policy against insuring
persons for losses arising from willful or criminal misconduct, as this would dilute the
goals of securities law to deter such conduct and to promote diligence among persons
subject to those laws.126 Coverage is pretty much limited to breach of duty, neglect, error,
misstatement, misleading statement, omission or act.127 Recklessness, residing in the
median, is placed sometimes on the insurable and sometimes on the uninsurable side of
this line.
On which side of the line accounting irregularities or fraud reside will influence
FSI’s efficacy and comparative appeal, since auditors under FSA are liable whether their
conduct is reckless or more culpable. In general, claims concerning financial statement
irregularities and fraud differ from typical securities law class actions that D&O and
entity coverage contemplate.128 The truth defense is unavailable when deliberate lies are
afoot, triggering standard policy exclusions and public policy limitations.
A common fact pattern appears: accounting irregularities are discovered—
whether due to internal audit, external audit or SEC pressure—and the company conducts
125

See YOUNG, supra note 110, at 157 (discussing D&O insurance, “[t]he starting point
in assessing coverage in the wake of accounting irregularities is ordinarily the deliberate
fraudulent act exclusion”). A typical policy provides: “The insurer shall not be liable to
make any payment for Loss in connection with any Claim made against an Insured . . .
arising out of, based upon or attributable to the committing in fact of any criminal or
deliberate fraudulent act. . . .” Id. This therefore excludes criminal and deliberate fraud,
but “provides coverage for fraud that arises out of recklessness.” Id.
126

See OLSON, HATCH & SAGILOW, supra note 85, § 6:11, at 6-26. For example, the
Investment Company Act of 1940, applicable to mutual funds and the like, prohibits
covered entities from including in articles or bylaws or providing by contract any
arrangements protecting directors and officers against liability resulting from willful
misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence, or reckless disregard of duties. Investment
Company Act § 17(h), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(b).
127

Concerning public policy limitations on D&O coverage for a class of egregious
conduct, see generally Francis J. Mootz, Principles of Insurance Coverage: A Guide for
the Employment Lawyer, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 37, 38 (1996); Michael Bradley &
Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate
Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 33 n. 205; Thomas A. D’Ambrosio, et al., Special
Project: Director and Officer Liability (Part 2), 40 VAND. L. REV. 599, 777 n. 16 & 784
n. 51 (1987); Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong With Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. (1989).
128

YOUNG, supra note 110, at 141 (“accounting irregularities [do] not necessarily give
rise to a conventional securities class action of the sort that D&O policies are specifically
designed to address”).
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a review and announces publicly an intention to restate financial statements for one or
more accounting periods. In theory, this substantially negates mounting a truth defense
and could render related conduct uninsurable (by virtue both of public policy’s fortuity
requirement as well as insurance policy exclusions expressing it).129
In each case, on the other hand, a mechanism is needed to determine the class of
conduct involved.130 Mechanisms range from a final adjudication to a determination by a
company’s directors independent from the issues and persons involved.131 In the case of
D&O insurance, most states prohibit coverage only when an insured is convicted of
fraud, though this varies across states. Such cases are uncommon. In fact, it is rare for
any class action to go through trial to a final judgment, including claims for securities law
disclosure violations and accounting irregularities or fraud.132 To this extent, as a
practical matter, insurance covers a wide range of culpable behavior despite contrary
public policy or insurance policy exclusions.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers further circumvent these public- policy and insurance-coverage
exclusions for intentional misconduct by not pressing fraud claims thatthey fear will give
insurers grounds to deny coverage.133 When D&O insurance exists, for example, this
129

See YOUNG , supra note 110, at 156:
[D&O policies are] primarily intended to address a conventional securities
class action [where defendants] do not admit they’ve deliberately said
anything wrong. Where accounting irregularities have surfaced, that is by
definition not the case. If the company has issued a press release
admitting to irregularities, it has already gone a long way to conceding the
existence of fraud. Even absent the admission of irregularities, the mere
acknowledgement of need for an earnings restatement concedes that
earnings numbers were incorrect.

130

See YOUNG, supra note 110, at 159 (explaining need for fact determination under
typical policy provision that “limits an exclusion of coverage based on deliberate
fraudulent acts to instances where there has been a final adjudication or other finding of
fact”). A typical provision excludes coverage “if a judgment or final adjudication
adverse to the Insured or an alternative dispute resolution proceeding establishes that
such criminal or deliberate fraudulent act occurred”. Id. Under such provisions, press
releases and restatements would probably not be enough to trigger the exclusion. Id
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E.g., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT RELEASE
NO. 11330 (Sept. 4, 1980) (providing framework for determining whether particular
conduct arises from such causes, including through a judicial or quasi-judicial
determination or by decision of a majority of a quorum of disinterested directors).
132

See YOUNG , supra note 110, at 160 (“virtually no class action litigation goes through
trial to a final judgment”).
133

See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 120.
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leads plaintiffs to avoid alleging “actual intent to mislead” in order to keep coverage in
place.134 They try to meet the relevant culpability standard (negligence under the
Securities Act of 1933 and scienter under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), being
careful not to proffer evidence of “intent or conscious knowledge.”135 An optimal FSI
regime should not require such litigation gymnastics or rely on the absence of final
adjudications of uninsurable conduct in order to provide coverage.
Avoiding such recourse for FSI may be achieved using judicial strategies that
balance the fortuity requirement with other public policy goals. Courts sometimes
interpret the fortuity requirement to vary depending on the viewpoint adopted (for
liability policies, whether the insured or a third party).136 While liability insurance
policies invariably exclude coverage for damages the insured intentionally causes, using
the third party’s viewpoint permits coverage enforcement. Injury to the third party is
seen as fortuitous (to it, injury is not certain); even though from the insured’s viewpoint
injury would not be fortuitous.137 Maximizing FSI’s acceptable scope of coverage could
draw upon these judicial strategies focused on viewpoint variances.138

134

See id., at 27.
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Claim restraint of this sort becomes more difficult to do when more types of conduct
are designated as criminal, including those so designated under Sarbanes-Oxley Sections
303 and 807. Section 807 creates a class of criminal securities law violations for knowing
execution (or attempts at execution) of schemes or artifices to defraud others or to profit
using in securities transaction. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 807, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. ____ (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1348) (fines and imprisonment
up to 25 years). Section 303 makes it unlawful fraudulently to influence the conduct of
audits. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 807, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15
U.S.C. ____ . The concepts of knowing and fraudulent in these statutes raise basic issues
of statutory interpretation, and additional unknowns when considering their interplay
with FSI. At minimum, the effect is probably to enlarge the population of conduct
deemed criminal, potentially putting coverage further out of reach of insurance policies,
whether D&O or FSI.
136

See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Construing the Fortuity Requirement in Coverage for
“Accident,” 4 CONN. INS. L. J. 855 (discussing Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v.
Pipher, 140 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying Pennsylvania law) where the court
adopted approach of analyzing fortuity requirement and related policy provision
excluding intentional or expected acts using insured’s standpoint and finding coverage).

137

JERRY, supra note 35, at 452. When the insured acts through others, as where
corporations act through employees, the employer-insured’s viewpoint renders their
actions fortuitous as well. Id.
138

See BORDON, DESKBOOK, supra note ___, at 85 (“In some states, it is against public
policy to afford coverage for certain misconduct. The state’s public policy thus becomes
a defense to coverage. . . .[S]ome policies exclude ‘matters uninsurable under applicable
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Justifying these judicial strategies requires two additional observations. The first
concerns how reimbursing people for intentional, undesirable, acts destroys a significant
disincentive to engage in those undesirable acts.139 For FSI, this concern can be offset by
observing that FSI does not displace liability for officers, directors, attorneys or
underwriters; it only substitutes insurers for auditors and issuers. With these active
agents facing liability risks—and insurers backstopping auditor work—sufficient
systemic deterrence should exist to permit enforcing FSI using an investor viewpoint to
treat the fortuity requirement as met.140
The second concerns the insurer’s perspective. Insurers have an interest in
excluding coverage for intentional acts. When premiums are based on probabilities of
fortuitous loss, intentionally-caused losses are neither contemplated nor accurately priced
into the premium.141 A partial response to this recognizes that the FSI model makes
insurers central participants as monitors of auditors and must provide them related
law’ from the definition of loss.”). Related case law construing D&O policies is mixed,
and may or may not be reconcilable. Compare American Guarantee & Liab. Assur. Soc.
v. Shel-Ray Underwriters, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 325 (D. Tex. 1993) (insurer has no duty to
defend antitrust claims based on alleged violation of penal statute) and Coit Drapery
Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (state statute
forbids insuring loss caused by a willful act, an implied exclusion of all insurance
policies) with Andover Newton Theological Sch., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 930 F.2d
89 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying Massachusetts insurance law) (in context of jury verdict for
violating age discrimination statute, reckless conduct does not preclude coverage) and
Atlantic Permanent Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. American Cas. Co., 839 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.
1988) (applying Virginia law), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988) (conduct that is
volitional but not intended to cause injury is insurable). See also Blast Intermediate Unit
17 v. CAN Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1996) (Pennsylvania public policy does not
prevent coverage for negligent violation of federal law since this does not encourage
intentional illegality).
139

Id.

140

A common contractual mechanism can be used to advance this objective. Insurance
contracting distinguishes between all-risk and specified-risk liability policies. The choice
is significant for burdens of proof in litigation. Under specified-risk policies, insureds
bear the burden of proving not only that a loss occurred but also that it is covered by an
enumerated cause. JERRY, supra note 35, at 411. Under all-risk policies, insureds need
only prove a loss occurred, whereupon the insurer bears the burden of proving that the
loss was caused by an exception. Id. Allocation of the burden of proof can determine
outcomes, making the all-risk versus specified-risk policy choice potentially pivotal. For
FSI, therefore, all-risk policies would be indicated, and probably should be required by
federal securities law to qualify FSI as an acceptable alternative to traditional FSA. See
supra note 123 and accompanying text.
141

JERRY, supra note 35, at 479.
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incentives. While this is an unorthodox insurer role for many insurance lines, including
D&O policies, it is congruent with insurer roles in the title insurance line. The remaining
solution to this insurer concern is for insurers to set FSI premiums in anticipation of this
approach to the fortuity requirement.
2. Application Fraud — A conceptual cousin of the fortuity requirement is the
application fraud defense. This permits insurers to deny coverage to insureds which
provide information when applying for insurance constituting material misrepresentations
on which insurer’s rely in issuing a policy. In some ways, FSI diminishes the
significance of this defense, though several issues need to be addressed.
In any insurance, insurers lack perfect information as to risk. To minimize
information risk, insurers require insureds to disclose requisite information in insurance
applications, and also may conduct independent investigation. These steps enable the
insurer to assess risk and decide whether to accept applications on an informed basis. The
application is usually incorporated into the policy when issued, making its material
accuracy a condition to the insured’s obligations under the policy.
For D&O and entity insurance, applications are accompanied by financial
statements, typically a company’s most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K.142 When
subsequent financial statements are afflicted by accounting irregularities or fraud,
chances are good that the application’s financial statements were likewise infected.143 If
the misrepresentations are material and the insurer relied upon them in issuing the policy,
state law permits it to deny coverage.144 Otherwise, insurers become victims too.145
142

See YOUNG, supra note 110, at 162-63
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Id. (“[W]here accounting irregularities have surfaced, the information given to the
insurance carrier may in fact be false. The insurance application may be false, for
example, insofar as it disclaims knowledge by any officer of circumstances that would
give rise to a claim”).
144

See YOUNG, supra note 110, at 162-63 (“To the extent it can prove the
misrepresentations were material and that the policy was issued in justifiable reliance
upon them, the carrier may potentially have still another basis to deny coverage and, now,
to rescind the policy”); BORDON, DESKBOOK, supra note 101, at 11 (materiality for
application misrepresentations are those affecting the insurer’s risk, decision, or
premium). State law permits rescission, usually putting the burden on the insurer to show
materiality and reliance (meaning it would not have issued the policy on the terms issued
had it known the truth). Id., at 14 (noting also that some states permit rescission for
innocent misrepresentation while others require intent or bad faith); e.g., Harbor Ins. Co.
v. Essman, 918 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Missouri law) (insurer’s claim against
accounting firm for negligent preparation of financial statements failed when insurer
alleged only that firm should have known it would rely on financial statements, rather
than that (1) firm prepared them to enable insurer to decide whether to issue D&O policy,
(2) firm knew insurer would receive statements and (3) insurer was within class of
limited, foreseeable class of reliant parties); Tiffany Indus. Inc. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 536 F.
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FSI will operate differently, more akin to title insurance than to D&O or entity
insurance. Applications will be required, but the information contained will be used only
to make an initial determination of whether to investigate a proposed policy risk. No
policy will issue until after the insurer’s auditor completes a full financial statement audit
and issues an unqualified opinion on financial statements.146 This audit condition gives
insurers access to information and enhances risk-assessment capabilities. It thus negates
the credibility of any subsequent insurer claim of reliance on managerial assertions. To
this extent, application fraud risk functionally disappears in FSI.
On the other hand, it may simply be moved back one step. Even an audit provides
imperfect information, given inherent limits on auditing. Auditors under generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) and as a matter of practice obtain additional
assurance during the course of an audit, including a formal set of management
representation letters as part of concluding an audit.147 These steps would not change
under FSI. Accordingly, evaluating FSI’s prospects requires attention to how
misrepresentations in these letters will be treated. To make FSI work, these statements
should probably not be accorded the same level of judicial protection as application fraud
statements.148
This requires considering judicial techniques used to evaluate application fraud as
a defense. A key interpretive issue is whether an assertion is treated as a warranty or a

Supp. 432 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (applying Missouri law) (to the same effect, adding that firm
must know insurer would rely and that financial statements were incorrect)).
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Business and legal realities can limit an insurer’s willingness to use application fraud
to deny coverage, risking both its reputation and legal claims for bad-faith denial.
Nevertheless, they sometimes do so. See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 120
(noting that insurers invoked this defense in the D&O cases arising out of securities law
claims against Adelphia, Enron, Sunbeam and Tyco, though in each case a court order or
negotiation led to some coverage).
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Unsatisfied audit conditions may lead to a renegotiation on new terms in certain
circumstances, as discussed in Part II.C.2 above.
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See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND
AUDITING FOR LAWYERS (4h ed. 2004), chs. 1 & 15 [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM,
INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING].
148

See also L. William Caraccio, Comment, Void Ab Initio: Application Fraud as
Grounds for Avoiding Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Coverage, 74 CAL. L.
REV. 929 (1986) (making the case for construing application fraud defense narrowly in
D&O insurance cases given limited reliability of related preexisting knowledge clauses).
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representation.149 Warranties are usually assertions of promise, the breach of which
operates as a condition to the insurer’s obligations, often whether or not material to the
insurer’s decision to provide a policy. Representations are usually assertions as to an
existing state of affairs, the breach of which operates to limit an insurer’s obligation, but
not to excuse it unless the representation is material. The differential effects of these
assertion types sometimes lead courts to characterize an assertion as a representation
rather than a warranty in order to deny the insurer an excuse from coverage altogether.150
State statutes have also been enacted to mitigate the stronger effects of breaches of
representations and warranties. These could be made applicable to FSI.
Transplanting this mitigation policy to FSI can be justified using a general
theoretical policy perspective. Strict interpretation of representations permits insurers to
take assertions at face value, facilitating more accurate risk assessments, and minimizing
investigation costs.151 The insured supplies the information rather than the insurer
searching for it; when claims arise, investigation is made but since claims arise on only a
small portion of a pool, overall costs are lower, benefiting all insureds as well as
beneficiaries. Denying coverage when misrepresentations are discovered protects the
insurer’s risk-classification model and decision. In FSI, however, the audit condition
entails investigation, neutralizing this public policy concern.
A misrepresented application means the insured was assigned to a lower risk tier
than was appropriate, effectively seeking more coverage for less premium than otherwise
available.152 Rejecting or diluting the misrepresentation defense forces lower-risk
insureds to fund the costs of covering higher-risk insureds. The trade-off, therefore, is
between protecting the insurer’s risk-classification model and extending coverage to
those not meeting it. For FSI, the balance tips in favor of limiting the application fraud
defense. Given the insurer’s full opportunity to investigate, risk classifications should be
precisely tailored to that investigation. Accordingly, extending coverage to protect
harmed investors should not impair the insurer’s risk-classification methodology nor
increase costs for other investors.
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For extensive discussion of warranties and representations and their judicial and
statutory treatment, and an overall assessment of their operation, see JERRY, supra note
35, at 777-811; the accompanying discussion draws upon that discussion.
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Another tool further distinguishes the concept of warranty between affirmative and
promissory warranties, the former being treated more nearly as representations of present
fact than of promises to continue a state of affairs. Id.
151

152

See JERRY, supra note 35, at 818.
Id.
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3. Occurrences, Not Claims-Made — Liability insurance can be claims-made or
occurrence based.153 Occurrence policies cover events occurring while a policy is in
effect (independent of when the event manifests damages, is discovered, or notice given
to the insurer). They are used in title insurance policies. In contrast, claims-made
policies cover damages discovered and notified to the insurer while a policy is in effect,
such as a given calendar year (independent of when the event occurred or damages
manifested).154 Claims-made policies dominate in professional malpractice insurance,155
and for D&O and entity insurance.156 A principal reason is that occurrence policies
create long-tail risk of obligations arising for periods extending well into the future, a risk
claims-made policies avoid.157
FSI will require occurrence policies, as in title insurance, not occurrence policies
used in D&O and entity insurance markets. There invariably will be a time lag between
the event causing damages (a material financial misstatement) and their manifestation
(revelation with value-destroying effects on securities). As retroactive coverage, FSI
covers a particular year’s financial statements, and extends coverage for numerous
subsequent years. For example, FSI would be written for 2005 and the policy would
remain in effect through 2007, 2008 or beyond. Assuming a three-year policy, in any
event, if material misstatements are discovered in years 2006, 2007 or 2008, they would
be covered.158
153

See Bob Works, Excusing Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditions in Order to
Avoid Disproportionate Forfeiture: Claims Made as a Test Case, 5 CONN. INS. L. J. 505,
520-22 (1999) (noting how these are not the only possible types of policy triggers and
that both often pose troublesome questions in application).
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Policies may also pick up claims as to which notice of possible occurrence is made
within a policy period though the claim is actually made after the period. See YOUNG,
supra note 110, at 154.
155

156
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See JERRY, supra note 35, at 530-536.
See BORDON, DESKBOOK, supra note 101, at 5.
BORDON, DESKBOOK, supra note 101, at 52:
All modern D&O policies are claims made policies. Thus, a claim must
be deemed made during the policy period to be covered under the policy.
Such policies are designed to avoid the ‘long tail’ effect experienced under
‘occurrence policies.’ Occurrence policies cover claims based on wrongful
acts which occurred during the policy period. Such claims may be
asserted long after the occurrence policy has expired.
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To promote FSI congruence with federal securities regulation objectives, policy terms
could be set to equal the relevant limitations on actions or of repose articulated in federal
securities statutes or case law. For example, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933
provides a one-year statute of limitations, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
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The general disadvantage with occurrence policies of the time lag between event
and claim is the resulting uncertainty, which can be considerable. FSI for fiscal year
2005 not generating a claim until 2008 complicates matching premiums received with
proceeds payable. Complexities arise from inflation effects as well as evolving or
shifting liability theories, both covering the insured’s behavior and coverage under the
policy.159 Claims-made policies overcome this disadvantage using probabilities
extrapolated from the number and size of claims made in previous years to the likely
number and amount in current and future years.160 Ultimately, therefore, the premiums
for these different kinds of policies differ materially.161
All FSI policies would necessarily be occurrence policies and federal securities
law authorizing FSI as an alternative to FSA should so provide. Other policy provisions
materially affecting the premium-coverage mix could be made mandatory or permit
tailoring subject to appropriate disclosure, as discussed next.
B. Premium-Coverage Mix
Apart from estimated risk of financial misstatement/audit failure, FSI’s premiumcoverage mix will be affected by numerous secondary factors.162 This is true of all
insurance policies, and arises because risks can only be managed, not eliminated.
209-10 (1976); Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 uses a statute
extending 2-years-from-constructive knowledge, subject to a maximum 5-year period of
repose. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 804, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at 745; 15
U.S.C. §§ ___.
159

See generally JERRY, supra note 35, at 533.
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See generally JERRY, supra note 35, at 533 (citing as providing useful historical
discussion, Zuckerman v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985)).
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E.g. JERRY, supra note 35, at 533 (“if an occurrence-based liability policy is priced
accurately, converting the basis of liability to claims-made should enable the premium to
be reduced because the maximum tail exposure is limited to one year, unlike an
occurrence policy that has theoretically unlimited tail exposure”).
162

In addition to those elaborated in the text, which are difficult, a more straightforward
but still important factor is that premiums are distinguished into gross and net; net
premiums are the portion paid associated directly with the risk covered; gross premiums
include additional amounts associated with the insurer’s administrative costs, overhead
and profit. See JERRY, supra note 35, at 611. The latter can vary across insurers based on
insurer-specific characteristics, including business model, firm structure and claimspaying capabilities. Companies would need to disclose these factors, to the extent
material, in proxy statements proposing investor approval of FSI. Federal securities
regulations may impose additional requirements. See infra Part III.
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Insurers use a variety of tools to measure and allocate risk, all of which can be tailored
for particular policies. Policy provisions that influence premium-coverage signals
include self-insurance mechanisms, coverage exclusions, the nature and scope of the
insurer’s obligations and the allocation of insurance responsibility when multiple policies
cover a given claim. As discussed below, all are likely to arise for FSI, in various
combinations with standardized techniques.
In combination, insurers use tailored provisions and standardized grouping
techniques to ideally relate premiums to risk. Grouping is performed as a preliminary
mechanism to classify risks by type (high-, medium-, or low-risk, for example).
Contractual standardization follows. Standardized forms reduce costs of negotiation and
disputation (including litigation) and enhance uniformity in judicial contract
interpretation.
The drawback is rough, imperfect, classifications. All insureds in the group pay
the same premium, but present greater or lesser risk. The result, called adverse selection,
is that within any group, a larger proportion of insureds will present greater rather than
lesser risk because that cohort receives a better deal.163 Adverse selection costs are
addressed using risk particularization and policy tailoring. Tools include the premiumcoverage mix, but also various contractual devices.
The combination of standardization and tailoring used varies across insurance
markets. In most insurance markets, including title insurance, standardization
dominates;164 in D&O and entity insurance, tailoring dominates.165 FSI should aspire to
maximal standardization to provide as much informational content to the premiumcoverage mix as possible, while allowing for sufficient tailoring to maximize premiumriskaccuracy (and requiring disclosure of material policy-tailoring). Leading issues for
tailoring and disclosure include those discussed in the following sections, some of which
would have to be mandated by federal securities laws in order for an FSI policy to qualify
as a lawful alternative to FSA.
1. Self- Insurance versus Over-Insurance — FSI differs from both entity and
D&O coverage (and the latter two differ from each other) concerning self-insurance.
This refers to policy provisions imposing deductibles, retentions and co-insurance on the
insured, designed to address moral hazard, disincentives to take precautionary measures
when resulting losses are paid by others. Notably, these provisions are usually higher for
entity insurance than for D&O insurance.166
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JERRY, supra note 35, at 169.
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JERRY, supra note 35, at 237
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See supra note 85.

166

See BORDON, DESKBOOK, supra note 101, at 8. Related provisions such as per-claim
limits likewise vary in how they are construed to treat multiple claims arising from the
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For D&O policies, self-insurance provisions were uncommon in the 1980s
through the late 1990s, but then became fairly standard.167 Coinsurance neutralizes moral
hazard by requiring the insured to bear a percentage of losses not covered by
insurance.168 Deductibles impose on the insured a minimum specified dollar amount of
losses, before the insurer becomes obligated to share. Deductibles encourage insureds to
prevent small losses; coinsurance encourages insureds to buy more coverage.169
FSI raises issues unlikely to be addressable by self-insurance mechanisms. There
are no agents whose conduct may be influenced.170 Directors, officers, attorneys and
underwriters remain exposed to liability risks to the identical extent as under FSA.
Insurers employ auditors and backstop the risk of audit failure, increasing auditor
incentives compared to FSA; issuer liability is functionally independent of regimes, since
its exposure is simply a derivative function of its agents. Accordingly, self-insurance
provisions may be limited in FSI, though any use influences related premiums, requiring
disclosure to make the premium-coverage signal meaningful and not misleading.
A greater concern arises when companies procure more insurance than necessary
or desirable. This could happen with FSI if greater credibility is signaled by highcoverage/low-premium policies. That could motivate managers to procure high coverage
without regard to value, making coverage a function of managerial confidence rather than
the probable magnitude of losses due to undetected financial misstatement. The device
could also be abused to inflate stock price. For investors, on the downside, the premium
will be higher than necessary when coverage is greater than value (or in any event greater
than is necessary); any potential windfall on the upside, moreover, may be unenforceable
under insurance law.171
Over-insurance issues in FSI can be addressed by drawing on a feature common
to certain business policies. Many business policies let coverage-premium factors vary
with designated business metrics. A good example is insurance covering inventory
same events or facts as single or multiple occurrences/claims, subjecting them or not to
the single retention and per-claim limit concepts. Id.
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See OLSON, HATCH & SAGALOW., supra note 85, §12:2, at 12-7.
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Coinsurance can be up to 100% of such uncovered losses. So if insurance covers 80%
of a property value and coinsurance is 100%, then the insured bears 20% of losses
(coinsurance can be less than 100%, shifting a greater burden onto the insured).
169

170

See generally JERRY, supra note 35, at 680-85.
See supra Part II.A.1, text accompanying notes 139-40.

171

See JERRY, supra note 35, at 686, n. 46 ((insurance policies producing windfalls can be
voided as wagers).

46

values, which may fluctuate monthly. Coverage and premiums can be set to vary with
inventory levels, which the insured calculates periodically and reports to the insurer.
Coverage and premiums are adjusted. The virtue to the insured is avoiding unnecessary
premium costs given the value and to the insurer of avoiding bearing risks proportionally
greater than premiums charged.172
An analogous approach may be useful in FSI. Coverage and premiums could
vary with a company’s market capitalization or other metric for the year covered. For
example, they could be set at a stated percentage of average market capitalization during
that year. This would reflect risks that public market valuations based on reported
financial statements are mistaken due to misstated financials Coverage levels would
thus differ year-to-year, driven by market valuation changes.173 Since FSI is retroactive,
covering a prior year, coverage can be based on known maximum risk, negotiated using
known quantities. Federal securities laws may need to specify metrics establishing bands
of minimum and maximum coverage, but a wide range in between would be permitted
and accompanying disclosure required.174
2. Primary or Excess: Other-Insurance Clauses — Another significant factor
affecting premiums relates to stacking, circumstances when particular claims are covered
by overlapping insurance policies. Questions arise concerning which are primary and
which, if any, cover only losses in excess of certain amounts or other coverage. To
truncate related disputes, ex ante, policies typically attempt to specify their rank in such
overlapping insurance situations using various types of so-called other-insurance
clauses.175 For example, D&O policies usually contain excess clauses, meaning they
apply only when and to the extent other applicable insurance is exhausted. Despite
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JERRY, supra note 35, at 445-46.
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This approach could also be called a valued policy, common in marine insurance,
where the policy stipulates an insured value, but not common in any other policies. See
JERRY, supra note 35, at 635-36.
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This approach to coverage levels echoes aspects of the warranty-auditing models
discussed in Part I.B.2 by using a somewhat contractual (market-based) coverage
determination with due concern for avoiding enforced windfall levels that would
bankrupt compensation-providers and thus reduce antecedent risks of driving audit
service providers to exit the auditing services market. See supra note 45.
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Other-insurance clauses vary widely, typified by pro rata, excess and excuse clauses
(their interpretation by judges also varies widely). Pro rata apportions coverage across
overlapping policies; excess makes one primary and others secondary, the secondary
policies covering only losses not covered by the primary one; and escape clauses void
coverage if other valid collectible insurance exists. For discussion of each, their use in
combination, and judicial interpretation strategies, see JERRY, supra note 35, at 739-50 &
752-57.
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contracting efforts, disputes frequently arise when insurers facing claims resist providing
coverage by pointing to the existence of other policies to be drawn on first.176
Overlapping insurance likely would occur in FSI-coverage situations. D&O
insurance would likely apply along with FSI, covering directors and officers participating
in preparing or certifying misstated financials.177 The interplay between policy types can
affect premiums. If investors focus on FSI’s premium-coverage mix, and not on D&O
premium-coverage data, managers could obtain a superior FSI premium-coverage mix by
making FSI excess while making D&O insurance primary, or pursue other combinations
using other-insurance clauses that cloud the reliability of FSI’s premium-coverage mix as
a signaling device.
Given the central role FSI would play in financial reporting and securities trading,
and the importance of the premium-coverage signal, FSI should probably be designated
as primary, not excess, and not contain any other-insurance clauses. This would avoid
both the uncertainties of outcomes common to overlapping policy disputes and prevent
biases in the premium-coverage signal that would otherwise arise. Accordingly, it may
be desirable for federal securities law authorizing FSI as an alternative to FSA to specify
that qualifying FSI policies must contain a policy provision specifying primary coverage
and omit any other-insurance clauses. In any event, requisite disclosure would be
necessary.
3. Indemnity or Defense — A significant factor influencing premiums is whether
a policy requires indemnity only or also requires defense. For liability insurance other
than that limited to indemnification, policies impose on insurers a duty to defend claims
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Courts attempt to construe overlapping policies to implement the intention of otherinsurance clauses; sometimes they harmonize (as where all contain pro rata clauses) but
not always (say all contain excess or escape clauses). When clauses are mutually
repugnant, however, courts often treat them as canceling each other and impose pro rata
coverage. See BORDON, DESKBOOK, supra note 101, at 111-12; id. at 112:
Some courts have held that the insurers share liability in proportion to the
limit of liability each policy bears in relation to the total available limits.
Other courts have been critical of this rule since carriers whose policies
have larger limits are obligated to share a greater percentage of liability for
losses at lower limits. These courts require the concurrent insurers to
share liability in equal amounts on a dollar for dollar basis until exhaustion
of the limits of the policy with the lower limit of liability. Thereafter, the
remaining insurer would pay 100% of the remaining liability, subject to its
limits of liability.
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The vast majority of public companies buy D&O insurance policies. See Black,
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against the insured and on insureds a duty to cooperate in the defense.178 The duty to
defend is functionally litigation insurance, entailing that the insurer shoulder the financial
burdens of being sued. The duty arises as to all claims potentially within policy
coverage, constituting an effectively broader duty than the duty to pay proceeds (actions
are required even if no duty to pay proceeds ultimately exists).179 The choice can thus
substantially affect premiums.
Traditional D&O policies do not impose duties to defend, but duties to indemnify
only. Most public companies possess requisite resources and expertise to mount effective
defenses without the need for the insurer’s resources. As a result, demand for FSI would
probably be for indemnity-only policies. Federal securities law should be indifferent to
this choice, however, permitting either but requiring appropriate disclosure to explain the
effects of the defend versus indemnity-only policy term on the premium-coverage mix.
C. Claims-Related
As noted when concluding Part I, Dr. Ronen’s FSI proposal sketches a
streamlined claims-settlement process, intended to differ from traditional insurance
processes using essentially private dispute resolution mechanisms.180 To recall, claims
are reported either by the insured company or by its investors to a fiduciary organization
jointly chosen by the company and insurer to act on investors’ behalf. This organization
assesses claims, notifies claims to the insurer, and it and the insurer in turn select a claims
adjuster to determine whether a covered claim exists and the amount of covered loss.
The claims adjuster reports to the insurer the covered amount and the insurer pays
investors this amount. As noted, this arrangement has an appeal of swiftness and
smoothness but raises numerous issues of adjudication of insurance law disputes.
Addressed below are the more significant of these, along with suggestions for molding
them into congruence with federal securities regulation objectives.
1. Liberal Notice Provisions — Most insurance policies impose strict notice
requirements, making compliance with specified procedures a condition to an insurer’s
obligation to pay proceeds. Typical requirements include notice given by the insured
being made promptly after an occurrence that might create covered liability. Courts
enforce such provisions, holding that effective notice must be provided by the insured
and that discovery by the insurer from investigation or from other sources is ineffective to
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See JERRY, supra note 35, at 845-55. Cooperation entails providing requisite
information, attending proceedings and general good faith. Material and prejudicial noncooperation can justify an insurer in refusing coverage. See infra section C.4.
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See JERRY, supra note 35, at 855 (citing Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Liability Regime and
the Duty to Defend, 58 MD. L. REV. 1 (1999); Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer’s
Duty to Defend, 2 CONN. INS. L. J. 221 (1997)).
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See supra Part I.C.4.
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meet the notice requirement.181 The rationale is to provide the insurer with a basis and an
opportunity to investigate.
Under Dr. Ronen’s FSI proposal, notice would be provided to the insurer by the
fiduciary organization.182 It is at least as likely, however, that sources other than such an
organization will be positioned to provide such notice. Candidates include the insurer’s
own auditor or management, as well as independent investigations by the SEC or
securities lawyers. To the extent an insurer receives notice from sources providing it a
basis and opportunity for investigation (certainly, for example, through its own auditor
conducting a current FSI audit), this discovery should satisfy the notice requirement.183
Accordingly, FSI policies should be required to include, or be construed as including,
more liberal notice provisions than apply to other types of insurance.184
2. Limited No-Action Clauses — Insurers do not always promptly perform
obligations, whether or not notice is properly made. When an insurer arguably fails, the
issue becomes who is entitled to enforce its obligations. The insured has this right but,
more importantly for FSI, are the circumstances under which investors (or a relevant
fiduciary organization engaged to act on their behalf) are so entitled. Most insurance
policies contain no-action clauses, expressly denying third-party loss victims direct rights
of action against insurers.185
No-action clauses specify that no action arises against the insurer until the
insured’s liability to third parties is established by final judgment or the insurer’s
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JERRY, supra note 35, at 629 (citing American Home Assur. Co. v. Republic Ins. Co.,
984 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 973 (1993); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Waldroup, 462 F. Supp. 161 (M.D. Ga. 1978)).
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See supra Part I.C.4.
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The notice provisions would also need to be harmonized with varying applicable state
laws. For example, some states, including New York, impose a strict notice rule. See
JERRY, supra note 35, at 634 (citing Steinberg v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 73 F. Supp.
358 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d 210 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2000); Gardner-Denver Co. v. DicUnderhill Constr. Co., 416 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
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Given insurance practice requiring notice promptly after an occurrence, it would help
FSI’s efficacy to develop guidelines governing when an occurrence triggering the notice
requirement arises. In general liability insurance policies, it is when an insured should
reasonably believe a potentially covered loss has occurred. For FSI, this could occur as
early as senior management becomes aware of possible financial statement irregularities,
by designated internal events, such as reporting by internal whistleblowers of these
conditions or, at the other end of the spectrum, when a company receives indications
from lawyers or institutional investors of a possible claim.
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See JERRY, supra note 35, at 655.
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agreement.186 These clauses prevent beneficiaries from suing insurers; they must sue the
insured. The theory, of course, is to prevent the insurer from defending a lawsuit in front
of a jury.187 For FSI to be effective, however, these clauses should be limited, at least to
authorize the fiduciary organization or claims adjuster to sue on investors’ behalf. Again,
federal securities laws authorizing FSI as an alternative to FSA could so provide.
No-action clauses pose particular problems when the insured is bankrupt, which
may be common in cases where losses arise under FSI policies. First, without a judgment
against the insured, investors have no way to sue the insurer. Second, the Bankruptcy
Code stays claims against debtors,188 preventing investors from obtaining a judgment that
would trigger liability under the policy. This undercuts the concept of the insurance and
would pose significant limits on FSI’s efficacy. FSI policies would therefore need to
include provisions making the insured’s bankruptcy or insolvency irrelevant to the
insurer’s obligations.189 This will support, but not guarantee, that a bankruptcy court
would lift the stay and allow the judgment (providing that any judgment won’t be
executed against the debtor’s assets but only against the insurer).190
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See JERRY, supra note 35, at 655 (citing Dvorak v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 508
N.W.2d 329 (N. D. 1993); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d
1204 (Ill. 1992)).
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See JERRY, supra note 35, at 655.
11 U.S.C. § 362.
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See JERRY, supra note 35, at 655 & 702 (noting that “all modern liability policies
provide that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured will not relieve the insurer of its
obligations under the policy” and that some state statutes require including this language
to address this problem, instancing Arkansas and Nebraska statutes).
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See JERRY, supra note 35, at 655-56. In contrast, a few state statutes provide
explicitly for direct rights of action by policy beneficiaries against insurers. See JERRY, at
656-57 & 702 (noting that the states are Louisiana, Rhode Island and Wisconsin, states
known as “magnets for suits” against insurers, citing also WILLIAM E. YOUNG & ERIC M.
HOLMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 112 (2d ed. 1985)). These
directly expose insurers to the loathed jury, creating conflicts with a different public
policy, reflected in trial rules treating as prejudicial error disclosure of liability insurance
when a defendant’s negligence is at issue. For cases concerning direct action statutes,
compare Quinlan v. Liberty Bank & Trust, 575 So.2d 336 (La. 1990) (construing statute
as permitting direct actions under liability policy but not under indemnity policy, and
finding subject policy a liability policy) with Black v. First City Bank, 642 So.2d 151 (La.
1994) (dicta) (distinction should not be made between indemnity and liability policies for
purposes of direct action statute); see also FDIC v. Duffy, 47 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 1995)
(applying Louisiana law) (permitting direct action by FDIC against law firm and liability
insurer arising out of federal banking regulation violations); FDIC v. MGIC Indem.
Corp., 462 F. Supp. 759 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (applying Wisconsin law) (permitting direct
action by FDIC against D&O insurer for negligence).
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3. Loss Payees — Under any insurance policy, numerous possible payees may
exist. In general, the insured is the person whose loss obligates an insurer to pay
proceeds.191 In liability insurance contracts, the insured is the contract party, and losses
are usually paid to it, though it is possible for the insured to assign the proceeds or to
designate one or more loss payees. Liability insurance policies often name the insured (a
company, say) and designate a class of persons having specified relationships to the
insured.192 For FSI, companies are the insured and policies would name as loss payees
those investors holding the company’s securities during the reporting period for a set of
covered financial statements.
Complex capital structures may pose apportionment issues. Some of these can be
addressed ex ante, perhaps mirroring relevant voting rules determining FSI approval.193
More difficult to resolve ahead of time are competing claims that seek to treat FSI as an
asset of the insured, as insurance policies are typically treated. When losses occur, loss
payees may face competition from other parties for claims on that asset. While an FSI
policy’s contract rights may accrue only to the insured and investors as loss payees, third
parties may assert rights to the policy’s value. Most state laws limit this maneuver, under
so-called state exemption statutes that put insurance policies outside the reach of an
insured’s creditors.194 These laws may be of limited utility for FSI policies naming as
loss payees both shareholders and debt-holders, however, leaving unresolved a
competition between them as well as with other creditors.
Policies would therefore need to clearly identify intended loss payees, rank their
priorities and provide mechanisms substantially as comprehensive as relevant bankruptcy
rules addressing the relation between an insured and loss payees on the one hand and the
insured’s non-covered creditors on the other. Failure adequately to specify these matters
can be addressed, ex poste, using the interpleader procedure.195 But evaluating FSI’s
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An example is insurance providing collateral for unsecured debt. See JERRY, supra
note 35, at 345.
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See JERRY, supra note 35, at 358 (referencing 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 15th rev.
ed. 1996). State exemption statutes do not necessarily prevent a creditor from attaching
a policy’s value or proceeds when the creditor’s funds were misappropriated and used to
pay policy premiums or when the policy formed part of a scheme to defraud creditors.
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efficacy must include these complex considerations, both as a regulatory matter to
determine whether to permit it as an alternative to FSI and to investors if asked to choose
between FSI and FSA. In the latter case, related disclosure would be necessary.
4. Limiting Defenses — An inherent limitation of third-party (liability) insurance
policies is that the insurer’s duty to pay proceeds is subject to the insured meeting various
conditions, over which loss payees lack control. Insurers may be discharged from
obligation when the insured makes misrepresentations, fails to give proper notice,
cooperate with the insurer, and so on. For many liability policies the problems are
potentially significant but not because of anything peculiar about the relation of the
insured to the loss; for FSI, the insured’s conduct likely will be central to the claims
process. This is the case even if a fiduciary agent or other claims adjuster is designated in
the policy as an investor representative. To minimize adverse effects of this risk, related
FSI insurer defenses should be strictly construed to protect investors, and policy
premiums set in anticipation of this approach.
5. Altered Good Faith — Insurers face numerous decisions in any claims-making
process, and FSI would be no exception no matter how the claims process is structured.
The FSI insurer’s goal of minimizing claim-losses may align insurer-investor interests
during audits,196 but it poses conflicts during claims-settlement processes. Investors want
to minimize claim losses arising from audit failure, but when insured audit failure occurs
they want to maximize claim recoveries. In the latter case, insurers have opposite goals.
This conflict in turn poses a conflict with traditional insurance law.
In third-party insurance, insurers are obliged to exhibit good faith towards the
insured and may be subject to tort liability to insureds when acting in bad faith.197 For
FSI, good faith requirements are likely to be necessary not so much to the insured as to
the loss payees, to investors. Enlisting insurers so directly in the auditing function under
FSI requires imposing on them the public watchdog and investor protection functions
associated with traditional auditing. As with most, though not all, other provisions
discussed in this Part, federal securities law could require such good-faith provisions to
appear in FSI policies in order for them to qualify as a lawful alternative to FSA. The
meaning of such provisions and remaining potential conflicts can likewise be provided in
public disclosure.
__________
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See supra Part I.C.2; Ronen, Post-Enron Reform, supra note 4, at 52-53.

197

The paradigm case arises in connection with third-party claims offering settlements
within policy limits that the insurer rejects, followed by judgments exceeding policy
limits to which insureds must contribute. The classic cases in a trio are Brown v.
Guarantee Ins. Co., 319 P.2d 69 (Cal. App. 1957); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins.
Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. App. 1958) and Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal.
App. 1967). See also Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1990)
(updating these classic cases and the standard fact pattern in analysis showing that
settlement behavior in tort cases is a product of the interaction between liability insurance
and the law and procedure of tort litigation).
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To recapitulate this Part’s discussion and analysis of approaches to insurance
matters necessary to make FSI efficacious as a matter of securities regulation: (A) (1)
insurance law’s fortuity requirement limiting lawful insurance coverage to nonintentional acts would require massaged application of the viewpoint concept to permit a
broad scope of coverage; (2) insurance law’s application-fraud defense excusing insurers
from payment obligations must and can be narrowly limited by relying upon FSI’s audit
condition and associated insurer investigation; and (3) FSI must be occurrence-based, not
claims-made, so that a policy covers a year’s financial statements but extends for
occurrences arising from that year’s financial statements for periods beyond the policy;
(B) factors affecting FSI’s premium-coverage signal driven by policy tailoring
instead of standardization would require: (1) disclosing self-insurance levels (deductibles,
retentions, and co-insurance), which are likely to be limited, and coverage-determinations
related to average market capitalization which might be bounded and appropriate
disclosure required; (2) making FSI primary not excess coverage and excluding otherinsurance clauses, or disclosing; and (3) disclosing whether a policy is indemnity-only
coverage or also oblige insurers to defend claims, and the related effect on the premiumcoverage mix; and
(C) concerning the claims-settlement process: (1) liberal notice provisions should
apply, with notice deemed given when insurers receive it from any reliable source; (2)
investors should be afforded limited direct rights of action against insurers, at least
through their fiduciary-organization agent or similar party; (3) loss payee clauses must
address complex capital structures to contend with a variety of priority issues, including
those arising as a result of an insured’s bankruptcy; (4) traditional insurer defenses
against insureds should be strictly construed; and (5) traditional insurer duties of good
faith should run to investors not insureds.198
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In sum, FSI’s efficacy depends upon relating the foregoing insurance matters to
securities regulation goals, largely achievable using a combination of contract, disclosure
and some judicial or regulatory interpretation or methodology. While the foregoing
major topics likely can be so addressed with modest federal overlays, a somewhat larger
final issue concerning insurer solvency and systemic stability is considered in the
following brief Part, before concluding the Article.

III. REGULATORY COORDINATION
Intricacies of insurance practice and law indicate a broad range of issues to be
addressed to make FSI workable. For FSI to be effective, it must concord with goals of
federal securities regulation. Part II highlighted the most significant harmonization
challenges, shown to be manageable using a modest federal overlay. In addition to
applying existing disclosure laws to compel describing material policy terms and their
effects on the premium-coverage mix, a federal statute akin to the Trust Indenture Act
governing debt instruments can be developed to require qualifying FSI policies to contain
specified contractual provisions.199
Justifying so amending the federal securities laws depends, however, on
confidence that relevant state insurance law will broadly be applied to FSI in ways
designed to facilitate federal securities regulation objectives. This invites a somewhat
more general perspective on this level of policy formulation and practice evolution before
reaching an ultimate conclusion concerning FSI’s efficacy and appeal.
Much existing federal securities regulation depends on the integrity of various
state laws, of course, especially state corporation law. A prominent example is the
interplay between shareholder voting rules under state corporation law and federal
disclosure policy. Current debate concerning shareholder access to proxy statements
illuminates how the interplay sometimes produces tensions requiring federal
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resolution.200 More general illustrations are discussions surrounding the numerous
accounting scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s and accompanying federal reform
of corporate governance traditionally handled by states.201
Unlike corporation law, however, which has long been a subject facing indirect
pressure from federal securities regulation,202 insurance law is primarily state law
strongly insulated from federal oversight and influence.203 To achieve requisite interplay
and coordination between federal securities regulation objectives and insurance law
applicable to FSI could require adjusting this model. In addition to certain matters
discussed in Part II not readily susceptible to handling by mandatory disclosure or
mandatory FSI policy terms,204 larger responsibility-sharing may arise because permitting
FSI as an alternative to FSA would depend critically and ultimately upon justifiable
200

See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS.
LAW. 43 (2003).
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See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate
Reform, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. ___ (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Jones, Rethinking
Corporate Federalism].
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See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003). Such pressure
is documented in debates dating to the 1930s, led by Justice Brandeis and Professors
Berle and Means, continued through the 1970s in a noted exchange between SEC
Chairman Cary and Judge Winter, and endured through the 1990s and today with scores
of articles devoted to numerous aspects of the subject. For a range of contributions, see
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATION LAW (1993); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992); Jones, Rethinking Corporate
Federalism, supra note 201.
203

The chief federal statute concerning insurance is the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.
§§ 1001 et seq., a Congressional renunciation of federal dominion over insurance,
directing that states, not the Congress, regulate insurance. See Barnet Bank v. Nelson,
517 U.S. 25 (1996). Thus while various federal statutes apply—including the Sherman
Act, various labor statutes, and of course tax laws—direct regulation of insurance when
Congress has not directly regulated it is a state matter. See Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: The Federal Role in Insurance
Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1993) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Federal Role in
Insurance Regulation] (reviewing history and policy of the Act in contemporary context
and prescribing continuing existing antitrust exemption and leaving solvency regulation
to states and letting insurance rates be set by market forces).
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matters arising in the bankruptcy context involving disputes between loss payees and
other claimants against the insured. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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confidence in the solvency of the insurance industry, and of particular carriers
underwriting FSI policies.205
Insurer solvency is a central concern of all insurance law, with state law generally
providing the mechanisms to promote it. But since FSI would form a central part of the
federalized enterprise of securities regulation, additional coordination efforts might be
necessary. Traditionally, state insurance law defers to markets for efficient and fair
insurance products, pricing and operation, with regulatory intervention requiring a
specific justification.
The commonest justification relevant to FSI concerns risks of excessive
competition among insurers yielding low premiums, leading to loss-payouts exceeding
aggregate premium volume, and producing industry insolvencies.206 Historically, states
regulated premiums to minimize insurance industry insolvency risk,207 though they
increasingly defer to insurer competition.208 Insurer solvency is instead promoted
primarily through capital-adequacy and annual-reporting and auditing mechanisms.209
Uncertain is whether these state approaches provide sufficient comfort to federal
lawmakers and regulators to justify placing FSI at the center of the financial reporting
and capital market processes. A federal role, at least in an oversight capacity, likely may
be necessary at the outset and on a continuing basis to permit FSI. Although this would
entail modifying federal-state responsibilities concerning insurance, this is not
impossible. At both a general and specific level of policy development, there is a basis
for anticipating that such a modification would be politically feasible.210
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Insurer bankruptcy is a potentially acute issue, as the 2001 bankruptcy of Reliance
Group Holdings, Inc. attests. For aspects of the related complex and protracted litigation,
see Koken v. Reliance Group Holdings, Inc. (In re Reliance Group Holdings, Inc.), 273
B.R. 374 (Bkrptcy. Ct. E.D. Pa. 2002).
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Consider generally the recent removal of regulatory walls separating the three key
aspects of the financial services industry, banking, securities, and insurance. From the
1930s until 1999, the three fields were held distinct by federal law (the Glass-Steagal
Act), with banking and securities regulated primarily at the federal level and insurance at
the state level. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 removes those barriers.211 No
doubt the federal regulation of banking and securities will not devolve to states; less
certain is whether traditional state regulation of insurance will not revolve up to the
federal level.212 Some insurance companies might prefer a federal approach, moreover,
some having lobbied for a federal chartering and licensing option.213 Emergence of FSI
could add substantial weight to this position, in turn enhancing FSI’s efficacy.
Consider more specifically the nature of the limited role federal authorities have
assumed in insurance markets. This role is usually reserved for providing reinsurance
mechanisms or programs to stimulate insurance coverage for extraordinary matters of
national public policy. The main historical examples of such a federal role in insurance
regulation are: insurance covering nuclear reactors;214 reinsurance for damages to urban
property damaged by riot or civil disorder;215 promoting political risk insurance covering
private business investment in developing countries;216 and funding of a national flood
insurance program.217
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Most recently, the federal government has developed a federal reinsurance
approach to terrorism insurance.218 The Terrorism Reinsurance Act (TRIA),219 adopted
in late 2002 in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, establishes a losssharing insurance model between the federal government and the insurance industry for
commercial property and casualty damages arising from defined terrorist attacks.220
TRIA refrains from dictating the manner of state rate regulation, but preempts state
insurance law relating to policy exclusions concerning terrorist acts by effectively
requiring insurers to offer terrorism insurance coverage and also confers exclusive federal
jurisdiction for litigation arising from terrorist acts.
These schemes show that federal entrée in insurance regulation always attempts to
narrow any preemption of related state insurance law. The incursions focus on promoting
insurer solvency through reinsurance schemes. FSI could comfortably follow this
approach of state insurance law supremacy, applying features such as a federal equivalent
of the Trust Indenture Act and disclosure policy to respect these boundaries. Any needed
federal role concerning solvency risk or reinsurance schemes would entail inquiry
replicating more general debates concerning federal versus state insurance regulation.
Ultimately this would require deciding whether financial reporting is more akin to major
national issues like nuclear power, riot, flood and terrorism where meaningful federal
intervention has occurred; or more akin to traditional insurance markets such as
automobile, life, fire, accident, disability, and health, where it has not.
It is not necessary to pursue this larger debate in this Article, but it may be useful
before concluding to identify one potentially significant factor in that debate. It concerns
tools the FSI industry likely would use to manage solvency risks in markets. For
example, Dr. Ronen suggests using financial derivative instruments to hedge and
distribute risks of FSI loss. Insurers would buy tailored put options on insured-company
securities with durations matching the FSI policy period.221 Puts would be exercisable
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when securities prices fall due to financial misstatements, spreading risk.222 Apart from
practical issues, such as determining causation and settling claims, such risk distribution
carries both advantages and drawbacks of systemic significance that may bear on the
relative need for a federal role in any FSI market.223
Risk distribution across the broader financial community beyond the insurance
industry should reduce overall risks of insurer insolvency. When risks are realized,
however, it likewise can cause systemic-breakdown through cascade effects. Similarly,
such capital-market reinsurance reduces risks of unraveling the market for auditing
services, but could increase unraveling risks when insurance markets contract (a
commonplace of insurance markets, as the history sketched above concerning D&O and
entity insurance indicates).224 Whether markets alone can shoulder such burdens is hotly
debated.225 The question of a federal role in FSI insurer solvency would generate like
intensity and the terms of that debate influence FSI’s efficacy.
Even if a federal role promoting insurer solvency wouldlikely be necessary or
feasible to facilitate FSI, some uncertainty would remain as to FSI’s overall stability and
utility. Federal regulation, after all, cannot assure these qualities (attested by the savings
& loan industry insolvency and bailouts of the late 1980s and other incidents).226
Accordingly, setting aside uncertainties associated with the appropriate federal-state
regulatory overlay to promote FSI insurer solvency, requisite mechanisms for other
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regulatory coordination appear available to mold FSI to achieve federal securities
regulatory objectives. Accordingly, a preliminary conclusion of FSI’s efficacy seems
justified.

CONCLUSION
The history of insurance showsproduct and coverage proliferation in proportion
227
to a society’s wealth. In poor societies, risks of loss are real but without discretionary
wealth, pooling risks by transfer and distribution is infeasible. In affluent societies, risks
of loss increase (more is at stake) and resources are available to meet costs of transferring
and distributing it. Modern U.S. history follows the path. The twentieth century
witnessed unprecedented increases in both wealth and risk of loss, and parallel increases
in insurance.228 Insured risks extend far beyond the concept’s ancient maritime origins,
and far beyond more modern innovations concerning fire, life, accident, disability, health
and liability.229 Well-known examples include insurance covering homeowners,
mortgages, and flood; more arcane examples are viatical settlements,230 and insurance
227

Crude forms of insurance emerged among the Babylonians and in the Code of
Hammurabi (around 2250 B.C.), with similar mutual aid programs developed in ancient
cultures of the Egyptians, Chinese, Greeks and others. Modern admiralty law traces its
roots to these mechanisms, which blossomed in seventeenth century England in the
practices of transferring and distributing (mostly maritime) risks among underwriters at
Lloyd’s Coffee House on London’s Tower Street. Insurance for other risks developed
more slowly than for maritime risks, beginning with fire (in the early 1700s), then life
(later that century), and accident (1849). JERRY, supra note 35, at 20-24.
In the United States, maritime insurers emerged in port cities, including
Philadelphia and New York, in the 1790s and early 1800s. Accident insurance came later
(and life insurance after that), when railroad travel both increased these risks and
generated resources to fund transferring and distributing them. Liability insurance
emerged after the industrial revolution, likewise concomitant upon the expansion of both
wealth and risk of losing it. Disability insurance followed at the turn of the twentieth
century, with health insurance proliferation a phenomenon of the second half of that
century. Id.
228

Professor Jerry provides staggering data. JERRY, supra note 35, at 24 (as of the late
1990s, US insurance industry commanded nearly $4 trillion in assets, provided 2.4
million jobs, boasted premium volume of $735 billion, sold insurance to almost all
homeowners and one-third of renters and about 2/3 of all persons had life and health
insurance).

229

For a short essay outlining key aspects of this history in relation to risk management
and behavioral economics, see Robert J. Shiller, Radical Financial Innovation, COWLES
FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER (April 2004).
230

See, e.g., Ffiona M. Jones, Note, The Viatical Settlement Industry: The Regulatory
Scheme and Its Implications for the Future of the Industry, 6 CONN. INS. L. J. 477 (2000);
61

covering risks of political expropriation, business interruption and—increasingly wellknown—terrorism.231
With the U.S. enjoying unprecedented wealth, and stock market capitalization
ranging around $10 trillion, it is tempting to see financial statement insurance (FSI) as
not far off. FSI is a potentially useful mechanism to address fundamental limitations of
the traditional auditing model, removing conflict and capture risks to provide financial
statement audits of superior reliability compared to traditional financial statement
auditing. Offsetting difficulties include a range of administrative complexities and need
to relate state insurance law to the objectives of federal securities regulation. As shown,
the issues are probably surmountable.
This Article highlights major structural and public-policy related issues FSI poses,
without intending comprehensive evaluation. The issues evaluated and solutions
suggested are necessarily preliminary. Other issues, and alternative solutions to those
discussed, are likely.232 Overall, however, the analysis justifies concluding that FSI’s
theoretical promise certainly warrants further examination.233 It may even warrant
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implementation, at least on a partial and experimental basis.234 A first step would
develop a regulatory framework to justify confidence in allowing companies to propose
to investors using FSI as an alternative to traditional financial statement auditing.235
Resulting experience would shortly reveal FSI’s efficacy and appeal in practice.
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